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Social media garnered much attention from the Arab Spring uprisings where activists 
took advantage of computer and mobile phone technologies to organize the collective 
actions of thousands of citizens. The influence and power of social media are only likely 
to increase. According to eMarketer (2012), by 2014, over one-fourth of the world’s 
population will be using social media technology. However, military planning has not 
fully harnessed this powerful tool. In trying to understand how this technology should be 
utilized by special operations forces (SOF), this thesis examines the role that social media 
plays in various forms of conflict across the globe. Specifically, this research assesses 
and identifies what types of social media should be used to support a range of special 
operations objectives, from strategic influence to disruption, coercions, and regime 
overthrow. Additionally, a social media assessment methodology is provided that can be 
used by strategists to evaluate the most appropriate use of social media technology to 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. GENERAL AREA OF RESEARCH 
What role did social media play during the revolutionary uprisings and regime 
changes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, commonly referred to as the Arab Spring? 
Collectively, these four countries experienced relatively rapid regime change, and one of 
the common factors in each was the citizenry’s use of social media as an organizing tool 
and communications platform. Taken together, the individual outcomes of each country 
affected by the Arab Spring seemed to indicate a causal relationship between the use of 
social media as a tool of protest, and the ability to overthrow a regime. Additionally, 
extensive use of anecdotal evidence by various authors has been offered as proof that the 
use of social media within the context of revolutionary struggle favors the insurgent 
movement. However, upon closer examination, it is evident that social media is a neutral 
technology. It can be used in both an offensive and defensive manner by those fighting 
the revolution, and those in power trying to put the revolution down.   
B. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
A lot of research, time, and effort have been devoted to examining the use of 
social media during the Arab Spring, and in social movements in general. Some argue 
that social media was a direct cause of the various regime changes that happened across 
North Africa and the Middle East. Others take the view that these various regime changes 
would have occurred without the use of social media. Still others take a middle ground 
approach, arguing that while social media did not play a central role in causing the 
revolutions, it did significantly increase the speed in which the revolutions occurred.1 
What is missing in the current literature regarding social media is a way to systematically 
assess the strengths and weaknesses of each side’s social media capabilities.   
                                                 
1 For a thorough bibliography of the Arab Spring Uprising, see the Project on Middle East Political 
Science web site at http://pomeps.org/category/academic-works/arabuprisings/. 
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Certainly, oppressive regimes have learned from the situations in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya, and Yemen. Thus, it is important for the United States to develop an organizing 
framework from which to evaluate the future utility of social media in executing 
unconventional warfare (UW), as it can be assumed that dictatorial leaders will be more 
prepared to counter social media sparked uprisings in the future. The purpose of this 
thesis is to provide that framework. 
This thesis will develop a social media assessment methodology that can be used 
by strategists to evaluate the social media environment in a given country or situation. By 
building an organizing framework with which to view social media as a tool for both the 
state and counter-state to utilize, strategists will be able to make better judgments in 
terms of how social media should be used (if at all) in trying to achieve U.S. objectives. 
More specifically, this exploration of social media in conflict will be focused primarily 
on UW. 
C. BACKGROUND 
For a social movement to emerge, a significant portion of a disenfranchised 
population must experience a transformation of consciousness.2 For an insurgency to 
emerge, three sets of factors must meld in a way that favors the insurgents. Initially, 
expanded political opportunities must emerge and combine with existing indigenous 
networks within the minority community. These expanded opportunities provide the 
insurgent movement the structural potential to act in a collective manner. This potential is 
transformed into kinetic activity by the critically important intervening process of 
cognitive liberation. Cognitive liberation entails framing the community’s perceived 
situation in life as unjust, intolerable, and mutable in order to mobilize a large group. 
Thus, all three factors are necessary but alone insufficient causes for the emergence of an 
insurgent movement.3  This process is graphically depicted in Figure 1.  
                                                 
2 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970, 2nd ed. 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 51. 
3 Ibid., 51. 
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Figure 1.  The Political Model of Social Movements4 
Also, a quick examination of revolutionary history shows that movements that are 
threatening to governments, and the governments themselves, will utilize all available 
tools of information dissemination either to fight or counter the revolution. Examples 
include the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and the Iranian revolution in 1979. The 
Bolsheviks made great use of the postal service and the telegraph. Those behind the 
revolution in Iran used tape recorders to smuggle in sermons recorded by the Ayatollah in 
Paris.5   
The unfolding events of Tunisia and Egypt provided a more recent example that 
demonstrates the competitive nature of the technological environment, in this case the 
social media environment. A Twitter hashtag, #sidibouzid, helped spark the first protests 
that turned into flash mobs in Tunisia. Additionally, Facebook pages were beginning to 
populate the Internet in protest of the Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali dictatorship. Attempting to 
stifle the voices of dissent, the Tunisian government began to hack into and delete the 
Facebook accounts of the activists. In response, Tunisian social media users reached out 
to the greater “hacktivist” community and asked for help. The hacker group Anonymous 
took up the cause and blocked the president’s official website, the local stock exchange, 
and key ministry’s websites. Additionally, the group provided a cyber-war survival guide 
to the citizens of Tunisia. This guide provided leaked wiki-leaks documents showing the 
                                                 
4 McAdam, Political Process, 51. 
5 Evgeny Morozov, interview by Marwan Bishara, IITrends, http://www.iitrends.com/2011/03/video-
social-networks-social-revolution.html (acccessed November 12, 2012). 
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corruption of the Ben Ali regime. The guide also provided tips for running from the 
police, and using proxy websites to regain access to Facebook and Twitter.6  
The Tunisian government countered these activities by executing a phishing 
operation that was used to steal the user name and passwords of citizens’ email, Twitter, 
and Facebook accounts in order to spy and silence online dissent.7  Eventually, the 
people of Tunisia won this competition and were able to oust Ben Ali. The successful 
revolution in Tunisia broke the fear factor in Egypt and provided the accelerant needed to 
fuel the Egyptian people into collective action.   
Egyptians began to share tips on topics such as self-defense and nonviolent 
resistance. Egyptian activists also began to make plans to circumvent existing police 
barricades, which were designed to prevent protestors from reaching Cairo’s Tahrir 
Square. On the other side, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had also learned from the 
events in Tunisia. In an effort to stop the January 25, 2011 protests from gaining 
momentum, the Egyptian government shut down the country’s Internet. Outside 
supporters responded by providing proxy sites that would allow Egyptians to circumvent 
the government’s block of the Internet. Additionally, journalists inside Egypt started to 
send “tweets” via text messages to their friends outside of Egypt. These friends would 
then turn the text message back into a tweet and send the tweet out via Twitter. In 
response, the Egyptian government began to arrest and imprison journalists in the 
country.8 
In light of the Arab Spring and the literature on social media’s use in conflict, this 
thesis argues that while social media is not a direct cause of revolution, it certainly helps  
 
 
                                                 
6 Al Jazeera English, “Empire,” 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/empire/2011/02/201121614532116986.html (accessed January 9, 
2013). 
7 Yasmine Ryan, “Tunisia’s Bitter Cyber War,”Aljazeera, January 6, 2011, 




to facilitate them. Additionally, social media technology differs from previous 
generations’ communication technology in that social media operates in a “super-sonic” 
manner, with the ability to reach so many, so quickly.9 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question addressed by this thesis is: How can one analyze 
and assess the social media environment in the context of a revolutionary environment? 
To address this question, the thesis also investigates several secondary questions, 
including: 
1. What are each side’s opening advantages and vulnerabilities in the social 
media environment? 
2. What are the critical factors or variables that contribute to an entity’s 
relative social media capabilities? 
3. What are the options available to each side in its utilization of social 
media within a competitive environment? 
4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of either using or not using 
social media in revolutionary movements? 
5. What are the specific effects that can be achieved by the state and by 
insurgent groups by using social media? 
E. CENTRAL CLAIM 
The central claim of this thesis is that social media can be an effective tool in 
achieving strategic goals of the U.S. within a UW campaign, and that they may play an 
important role in future U.S. UW campaigns. However, the appropriate use of social 
media depends on the specific situation on the ground. Just as there is no one-size-fits-all 
approach to military strategy in general, there is no set strategy in the utilization of social 
media. Looking at the spectrum of unconventional warfare objectives: disrupt—coerce—
overthrow, in relation to the relative technical capabilities of a given country, will assist 
in determining what goals the U.S. should work to obtain via social media. For instance, 
one set of conditions on the ground, such as the ones found in Egypt, may mean that 
                                                 
9 Carl Bernstein, interview by Marwan Bishara, IITrends,  http://www.iitrends.com/2011/03/video-
social-networks-social-revolution.html (acccessed November 12, 2012). 
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social media could be used in an effort to overthrow a regime. On the other hand, in Syria 
for example, social media may only be used to help disrupt or coerce the government to 
reform certain policies. To help strategists determine whether and how social media can 
support a UW campaign in a given country or situation, this thesis will develop a social 
media assessment methodology that can be used to evaluate a social media environment.   
F. LITERATURE REVIEW 
One of the key debates within the literature is the extent to which social media 
conditions or facilitates the likelihood of revolution. On one hand, social media is 
portrayed as the single most significant causal factor of revolution. On the other, the role 
of social media is more nuanced as one of many tools of information sharing. In other 
words, other conditions must be in place for social media to have a significant impact on 
social revolution.10 Representing the former, journalist Andrew Sullivan declared in 
2009, “the revolution (in Iran) will be Twittered!”  Sullivan’s comments came as several 
thousand social media users in Iran attempted to mobilize the citizens in that country to 
move towards regime change. However, as the next several months played out, there was 
no revolution in Iran. Since Sullivan’s famous remarks were made, several prominent 
journalists have argued that social media, in and of itself, can be a primary cause of 
revolutionary changes. Arguably the most prominent supporter of the political power of 
social media in social movements is author Clay Shirky. In his article, “The Power of 
Social Media,” he opens with what he describes as the first major use of social media to 
affect political change.11 
According to Shirky, some seven million text messages were sent during the week 
that Philippine President Joseph Estrada was on trial, facing possible impeachment. 
When several news sources revealed that Estrada loyalists in the Philippine Congress had 
voted to set aside key evidence against the sitting president, a citizen initiated protest was 
organized. In response to the simple text message, “Go to EDSA, Wear blk,” over one 
                                                 
10 Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare,” Special Warfare 
Magazine 27, no.1 (2013). 
11 Clay Shirky, “The Political Power of Social Media,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 1(2011): 28–41. 
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million people descended on downtown Manila. Eventually, the country’s legislators 
gave in to the crowd’s pressure, re-introduced the damning evidence against Estrada, and 
on January 20, 2001, Estrada was finished as president.  Using this example, and several 
others, Shirky’s primary argument is that the United States should continue to push for 
and support unrestricted access to the Internet and to social media for every person in the 
world. Internet freedom, Shirky states, facilitates advances in civil society in the long run, 
and helps to prevent abuses of power in the short term. Social media accomplishes these 
objectives by exponentially increasing the spread of information, the type and numbers of 
speeches by ordinary citizens, and the spread of group coordination.12  Shirky provides a 
caveat to his arguments by stating that ultimately social media’s effect is limited when a 
government is willing to turn its guns on its own citizenry as was done to the Green 
Movement in Iran, and to the Red Shirt protestors in Thailand. Stated simply, killing is 
often an effective way to maintain the status quo. Other authors argue that future 
revolutions will not be tweeted. 
The two most prominent opponents to the argument that social media matters in 
the context of revolutionary movements are Malcolm Gladwell and Evgeny Morozov. 
Gladwell opens his article, “Small Change; Why the Revolution Will not be Tweeted,” 
with an example of a social movement spread without the use of social media. This social 
revolution started in Greensboro, North Carolina in 1960, and centered on a local 
Woolworth’s refusal to serve a cup of coffee to a black college student. Starting in that 
one store, in that one city, Gladwell describes the rapid spread of other protests 
throughout the South that eventually numbered over 70,000 protesters, saw thousands 
arrested, and sparked the decade-long civil-rights war.13  Gladwell states that successful 
social movements are centered on an individual’s strong ties to one another. Examples 
provided include the participants in the Freedom Summer movement in the United States, 
the Red Brigades in Italy, and the mujahideen in Afghanistan. The argument here is that 
                                                 
12 Shirky, “The Political Power of Social Media,” 29.  
13 Malcolm Gladwell, “Small Change: Why the Revolution will not be Tweeted,” The New Yorker, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell?currentPage=all (accessed 
August 20, 2012). 
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people join movements primarily because they have a close friend or relative who is 
already in the social movement, this connection representing a strong tie. 
With the use of social media, however, the connections between users is centered 
on weak ties.14  Although there are many powerful connections that can be the result of 
these weak ties—new ideas and innovations, interdisciplinary collaboration, or the ability 
to seamlessly match sellers to buyers,—weak ties seldom lead to high-risk activism. In 
this argument, Gladwell states that it is easy to get lots of people with whom one has 
weak ties to do something on one’s behalf, given that the task does not ask too much of 
others. Thus, Gladwell draws a sharp distinction between a Facebook friend and a real 
friend. Additionally, Gladwell argues that although social media is a great way to build a 
network structure, networks are not effective at accomplishing certain tasks. Because 
networks do not have a central leadership structure, there is difficulty reaching any kind 
of consensus, and no way to set an agreed upon goal. Networks cannot think strategically, 
and are chronically at risk of constant conflict and error. According to Gladwell, giving 
everyone an equal voice is not necessarily a good thing. Thus, social media makes it 
easier for activists to express themselves, but harder to convert the ability to express ideas 
into tangible action that results in something that is impactful. Morozov shares much of 
the same views on social media that Gladwell does. 
In his book, The Dark Side of Internet Freedom, Morozov argues that rather than 
a force for positive change, having unlimited access to the Internet and social media 
actually results in an increased ability for repressive regimes to suppress free speech, 
increase the effectiveness of surveillance, increase the spread of propaganda, and help to 
pacify citizens with mindless, digital entertainment.15 Thus, the U.S. must stop viewing 
social media as inherently liberating but more as a neutral technology. In fact, Morozov  
 
                                                 
14 Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 
(1973):1360–1380, 
http://sociology.stanford.edu/people/mgranovetter/documents/granstrengthweakties.pdf (accessed 
May 15, 2013). 
15 Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011). 
 9 
states that social media and the Internet may actually favor the state, especially dictatorial 
regimes that are willing to use excessive amounts of violence against their own people to 
stay in power. 
The truth may lie somewhere in the middle of these two opposite views. The 
research done in this thesis clearly shows that people simply having access to the Internet 
and social media is not enough to allow them to cause a sustained revolution. However, it 
also indicates that social media technology, if used in smart, creative ways, can facilitate 
and accelerate the pace and growth of an insurgency. Therefore, social media is an 
inherently neutral tool. The side that uses this tool most effectively will gain a significant 
advantage in determining the ultimate victor in a conflict. 
G. THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis contains five chapters and three appendices. The first chapter 
introduced the general area of research, the purpose, some background information (to 
include a description of the Political Process Model of social movements), the hypothesis 
and research questions, and concluded with a literature review. Chapter II opens by 
applying the military acronym OAKOC to social media as a way of better understanding 
this competitive environment. The chapter provides some technical background 
information which describes how the Internet and social media platforms actually work. 
It introduces a conceptual model that is designed to facilitate the understanding of the 
competitive landscape of social media. The second chapter concludes with a description 
of the technologies and means that governments use to censor and conduct surveillance 
within the social media environment, and a description of the technologies dissidents use 
to avoid being censored and kept under digital surveillance.   
Chapter III provides an overview of how certain social media platforms and 
technologies have been used to assist in the execution of various types of operations, in 
different types of warfare. More specifically, the focus of this chapter centers on the use 
of social media to support insurgent warfare, counterterrorism (CT), and counter-
insurgency (COIN) to achieve a range of desired end-states ranging from disruption to 
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overthrowing/defeating a ruling regime or a major insurgent group  The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of future trends in using social media in conflict. 
Chapter IV starts with an outline of twelve key factors that should be taken into 
account by military planners in assessing the most appropriate use of social media 
technology in conflict. More specifically, the chapter primarily focuses on assessing the 
best use of social media technologies in support of an UW campaign. The second part of 
the chapter identifies the various overarching ways in which social media can be used in 
conflict. This menu of options is ranked based on the relevant amount of risk a person 
would face in using social media in a particular way. Finally, this chapter identifies and 
discusses the limitations and potential misuses of social media technology in 
revolutionary warfare, that is, both the conditions in which social media should not be 
used and the objectives that social media should not attempt to accomplish. 
Chapter V is the concluding chapter and provides recommendations for the 
authorities, training and education, and the doctrine needed to maximize the potential of 
social media in support of military operations. Please note that a thorough reading of the 
technical discussions in Chapter II is not essential to the remainder of the thesis. Chapters 





II. THE INTERNET AND SOCIAL MEDIA: AN INTRODUCTION 
One of the United States’ special operation forces’ imperatives is to understand 
the operational environment. According to Army doctrine, “Special operations cannot 
shape the operational environment without first gaining a clear understanding of the 
theater of operations.”16 At a more elementary level, Infantry second lieutenants are 
taught to evaluate the environment they will be operating in by using an acronym to 
describe the physical terrain. This acronym is OAKOC. It stands for observation and 
fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment.17  
By studying each of these aspects of the physical terrain in which missions will be 
conducted, good platoon leaders can visualize how to best navigate within their area of 
operations. In a similar manner, they must understand the social media environment in 
order to operate within this virtual domain. Applying OAKOC to the various aspects of 
social media throughout this chapter will add a familiar framework to the descriptions of 
each part of this online environment. First, the thesis will examine the social media 
environment from a broad perspective. 
To begin to understand the social media environment, it is important to first 
establish social media’s taxonomy. Most broadly categorized, social media falls under the 
communications media umbrella. Examples of other technologies that belong to this 
category include platforms such as television, radio, the Internet, print media and any 
other tools used to communicate. Narrowing the taxonomy further, social media falls 
largely within a sub-component of the Internet, namely the World Wide Web. Still 
further, social media is part of Web 2.0 technology. Web 2.0 is defined as “a set of 
applications and technologies that allows users to create, edit, and distribute content; 
                                                 
16 Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 3-05, Special Operations (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of the Army, 2012), 13,  http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp3_05.pdf 
(accessed March 12, 2013).  
17 Department of the Army, Army Field Manual 3-21.8, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2008), 1-45, 
https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog/view/100.ATSC/04183AF4-34EB-47F0-BCEE-29C93432DA49-
1274564010088/3-21.8/toc.htm (accessed March 12, 2013). 
 12 
share preferences, bookmarks, and online personas; participate in virtual lives; and build 
online communities.18 In addition to Internet-enabled social media platforms, social 
media also includes mobile phones as well as other handheld devices (the iPod Touch 5th 
Generation, for example). With social media’s taxonomy complete, the social media 
environment itself will be examined. 
At the most basic level, the social media environment relies on the Internet and 
various pieces of hardware and software to operate. Satellites and cellular phone towers 
also facilitate the use of social media. In the context of social media’s use during a period 
of conflict, the primary context of this thesis, the social media environment should be 
examined by looking at the technologies that are used by a state for the purposes of 
censoring, monitoring, locating, and keeping surveillance on dissidents. Conversely, the 
technologies that those in rebellion use to circumvent state activities and remain 
anonymous should be examined.   
This chapter will provide a basic overview of how the Internet operates, the 
hardware and software that is needed to run the social media environment, the 
technologies used to censor, monitor, and keep surveillance on social media users, and 
the technologies used to avoid detection and remain anonymous while using social 
media. Additionally, this chapter will provide a graphical model for visualizing the social 
media environment and framing the subsequent chapters. Graphically depicting the 
competition space is important as war practitioners seek to understand how to articulate 
intent in using social media technology during periods of conflict. This chapter will 
conclude with some additional points to consider when examining the social media 
environment, including a discussion on the future of the social media environment.   
To begin to apply the OAKOC framework to the social media environment, the 
thesis will begin with the most important aspect of analyzing any environment, 
identifying the key terrain. In the majority of military conflicts, from antiquity to the 
modern conflict currently waging in Afghanistan, the expression “control the high 
                                                 
18 Kenneth Laudon and Carol Traver, E-Commerce: Business, Technology, Society, 7th ed. (Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2011), 18. 
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ground” is used by commanders to identify the key physical terrain in their operating 
environments. Identifying the high ground is a fairly simple task, yet can be overlooked 
in the heat of battle. Similarly, the single most critical consideration in examining social 
media is also simple, but can be overlooked in the heat of the moment. This critical factor 
is connectivity to the Internet and/or to cellular phone towers. To begin the discussion of 
the Internet, the key terrain of the social media environment, it is important to understand 
how this communications platform actually functions. 
A. THE INTERNET—KEY TERRAIN  
The most basic task of the Internet is to facilitate the movement of digital 
information from an origin to a specified destination, using the most suitable path 
available and the most appropriate mode of transportation.19 A primary question is how 
this is accomplished?   
The Internet is a network of networks connected by devices called routers. 
Routers are responsible for managing the flow of information between networks. They 
work by forwarding data to another router closer to the end destination for a data request. 
The networks comprising the Internet are owned and operated by organizations called 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Smaller, regional ISPs typically buy Internet access 
from very large national or multinational ISPs. These ISPs have various Points of 
Presence (POP) in each region in which they operate. Each connected computer that links 
to a specific POP network is then connected to the backbone.20 Individual Internet users 
connect to the Internet either directly through an ISP or through an organization’s internal 
network (e.g., a local area network or LAN), which in turn is connected to an ISP. 
The Internet backbone is comprised of major networking equipment and global 
data connections comprised of fiber-optic cables and satellite links. The backbone owners 
connect to each other at major hubs known as Network Access Points (NAPs) or Internet 
                                                 
19 Ronald Deibert et al., “Circumvention Tools,” (2011), 
http://howtobypassinternetcensorship.org/files/bypassing-censorship.pdf (accessed February 11, 2013). 
20 Ibid. 
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Exchange Points (IXPs).21  These backbone connections are what enable Internet users in 
countries around the world to communicate with one another. Finally, the routers that 
connect internal networks to the Internet or that connect local or national networks to the 
global Internet are sometimes referred to as gateways. It is important to understand all of 
these points of connection because Internet traffic can be censored, monitored, or 
otherwise controlled at any number of these routers and gateway connections.22  Figure 2 
is a very simplified graphical depiction of the major components of the Internet.  
 
Figure 2.  How the Internet Works23 
All of the connections made to the Internet use some type of standard or protocol. 
These protocols allow one Internet-connected computer to find and transmit data to 
another Internet-connected computer. The most basic protocol is called the Internet 
Protocol or IP. This protocol is responsible for routing all data, which is assembled into 
                                                 
21 Laudon and Traver, E-Commerce, 145–147. 
22 Deibert et al., “Circumvention Tools.”  
23 Jeff Tyson, “How Internet Infrastructure Works,” How Stuff Works, 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/basics/internet-infrastructure1.htm (accessed February 8, 
2013). 
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packets, through the Internet. Another important protocol is the Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP). This protocol sets up a reliable connection with a remote device that 
ensures packet delivery. The TCP uses IP to transmit and route the data it sends. 
In order to connect to the Internet, a device needs a numeric IP address. While 
some addresses are static, others are assigned dynamically at the time of connection. The 
IP addresses assigned to Internet servers that host Websites and email are static, although 
they can be changed. For the most part, users need not be concerned with IP addresses. 
Instead of having to memorize a long stream of numbers (the actual IP address), the 
Domain Name Server (DNS) system matches numbers like 216.92.171.152 to names 
such as www.witness.org.24  
The information that one sends through the Internet can take many forms. 
Examples include Web pages, email, pictures or video, a database, a secure text file, a 
software program, and many others. To handle these various information forms, a variety 
of specific protocols have been developed. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) 
supports Web traffic. Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP) handles emails. Extensible 
Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) is designed for routing instant messaging. File 
Transport Protocol (FTP) accommodates file sharing. Peer-to-peer file sharing can be 
done through the Bit Torrent protocol. Other protocols include Voice-Over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP), Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Real-time Transport Protocol 
(RTP) among others. All of these protocols use IP, and many use TCP as well. A brief 
summary of how information flows across the Internet via the Web allows the thesis to 
bring the entire discussion into focus. 
Suppose a person wants to visit the website www.witness.org. To do so, the user 
would type that website name into a Web browser and hit enter. The Internet-connected 
device would send this domain name to a DNS server. The DNS server would return a 
message that contains the IP address for this website, currently 216.92.171.152. The Web 
browser would then send a digital request to that IP address using TCP (which will use 
                                                 
24 Deibert et al., “Circumvention Tools.” 
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IP) asking to set up a connection. This request would get sent through a serious of 
routers. Each router would send the request to another router that is closer to the final 
destination until the specific machine is reached. This machine would then acknowledge 
the TCP request. Once the connection is established, the browser would send an HTTP 
request to the Web server requesting the page at the Web address. The HTTP request will 
use TCP, which in turn will use IP, to transmit the request over the established 
connection. The Web server in turn would use HTTP to send the requested page back to 
the browser for display on the user’s monitor. The route that the information from the 
website actually goes through is different from the original path. Each stop along the way 
is known as a “hop” and the number of hops between a user and a website is typically 
between five and 30.25   
All of this information is important in the utilization of social media in support of 
UW.  Having a basic understanding of how the Internet operates will facilitate a better 
understanding of the technologies that support the social media environment and the 
technologies used to exploit its various capabilities by both states and those that oppose 
states. Having this understanding facilitates a special operations forces (SOF) operator’s 
ability to evade state monitoring and censorship. Additionally, this knowledge will help 
in understanding where vulnerabilities are in terms of the Internet.   
If a planner is aware of where an individual insurgent’s Internet connections are 
most vulnerable along this massive chain of interconnected machines, and where 
connectivity is needed most, he or she will be better able to apply resources and develop 
plans to maintain Internet connectivity for those whose objectives align with the 
planner’s objectives. Several examples of innovative and creative ways to gain control of 
Internet connectivity will crystallize this discussion.  
One of the U.S. State Department’s primary objectives under Secretary Hillary 
Clinton was to ensure that repressed peoples around the world had digital connectivity to 
                                                 
25 Deibert et al., “Circumvention Tools.” 
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the rest of the world.26 To that effort, the U.S. government has been developing a small 
package of hardware and software that can be employed stealthily in almost any 
environment. The concept, known informally as the “Internet in a suitcase,” can provide 
wireless communications over a large area which facilitates connectivity to the global 
Internet.27 A graphic representation of the basic concept is shown in Figure 2. Basically, 
the system uses mesh network technology that can transform simple devices such as cell 
phones and laptops into a vast wireless network, without the need for a centralized hub.28 
Thus, a text message, email, or picture could hop along individual, modified cell phones 
and computers, with each machine acting as its own small cell tower, thus bypassing a 
government’s state controlled infrastructure. This asset has the potential to enable 
activists in countries like Iran, Syria, and North Korea, for example, to be able to 
communicate outside of their government’s control.   
                                                 
26 James Glanz and John Markoff, “U.S. Underwrites Internet Detour Around Censors,” The New York 





Figure 3.  The Internet Suitcase29 
Another key characteristic of a system like  the Internet in a suitcase,   that is 
important to highlight, is that it operates on a completely different pathway from what the 
government and general citizenry are using. This makes stealthy Internet connectivity 
hardware and software different from traditional circumvention tools (which will be 
discussed in depth later in this chapter). Traditional circumvention tools, such as proxy 
websites, while operating on the global Internet, are usually accessed through state-
controlled ISPs. Internet provided by stealthy technology avoids these state-controlled 
ISPs. A second example of an emerging means of controlling social media’s key terrain 
is Bluetooth technology. 
Traditionally, Bluetooth technology is used to facilitate a headset communicating 
wirelessly with a cell phone, or for an iPod to play music wirelessly through a stereo. 
However, technology that is being partially funded by the U.S. State Department will 
                                                 
29 Glanz and Markoff, “U.S. Underwrites Internet Detour.”  
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allow dissidents to make slight software modifications to their cell phones that will open 
up new communication capabilities. This new technology would, for example, allow a 
video of a protester being beaten by state police to jump from cell phone to cell phone 
automatically within a network of trusted insurgents.30  As the circle of trust within the 
insurgent group widened and more people were brought into the movement, the 
dissemination of such information would increase as well.   
With an explanation of how the Internet functions and a discussion of the 
importance of Internet connectivity complete, the thesis will discuss how social media 
platforms actually operate. Understanding how these sites function is important, because 
individual social media sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, represent avenues of 
approach within the social media environment. These avenues of approach, which can 
also be conceptualized as the various options available to navigate the social media 
environment, allow individuals to connect with the people and information that will help 
facilitate an insurgent group’s desired end state. 
B. SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS—AVENUES OF APPROACH 
 A major social network website, such as Facebook or Twitter, requires a 
combination of powerful software and hardware. Despite different functionalities 
provided by each social media platform, there are many similarities in how each platform 
functions. First, most social networks use open-source software.31  In fact, nearly all of 
the operating systems behind sites such as Twitter, LinkedIn, and MySpace are Linux 
based (Facebook uses F5 Big-IP). Additionally, most social media sites use Apache Web 
server and MySQL as their database management system. In order to respond to millions 
of users’ simultaneous demands on the platforms, social media sites predominately use 
software called Memcached to handle the massive data requirements of the various social 
                                                 
30 Glanz and Markoff, “U.S. Underwrites Internet Detour.”  
31 Steven Vaughan-Nichols, “How Social Networking Works,” IT World, 
http://www.itworld.com/software/91803/how-social-networking-works (accessed November 12, 2012). 
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network applications.32  In addition to the multitude of layered software applications, 
social network sites need massive amounts of computer hardware to operate. 
The most extreme example of the type of hardware necessary to run a major 
social networking site is Facebook. The Silicon Valley based company uses over 30,000 
servers to handle the hundreds of billions of page views the company serves up every 
month.33 Each site uses high powered switches to connect each of their servers. Finally, 
enormous storage servers are built to store the petabytes (1015bytes) of user data. 
Typically these data centers are located near major Internet NAPs so that they can be 
connected to the fastest Internet connections possible. With these massive systems 
costing hundreds of millions of dollars, most individuals will never be able to build a 
social network on this scale. However, by realizing and understanding that social 
networks are built on open-source (often free) software, individuals, including those 
working for revolutionary change, can easily and quickly start their own, fully functional 
social networks. 
There are dozens of companies and software applications that allow individuals to 
start social network websites. Examples include Elgg, Lovd by Less, Drupal, and Pligg. 
Even easier to deploy is Ning. Ning is a simple, turn-key program that allows customers 
to have a social media website up and running in a matter of minutes. For as little as 
$49.00 a month (price as of March 31, 2013), individuals can host up to 10,000 members. 
Doubling the payment to $99.00 a month allows a website creator to host up to 100,000 
members.34 Ning’s customizable templates include custom member profiles, a blog and 
forum feature, photo and video embeds, group pages, events, chat, and privacy options 
within the network. Additionally, the site can integrate seamlessly with other social 
media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Google Plus, and others. Ning sites are 
also optimized for mobile applications such as smartphones.35   
                                                 
32 Vaughan-Nichols, “How Social Networking Works.” 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ning.com, “14-Day Trial on all Plans,” Ning.com, https://www.ning.com/pricing/ (accessed March 
31, 2013).  
35 Ibid. 
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This easily created social network platform provides another potential option for 
those wishing to take advantage of the power of social media as a communications 
platform, yet allowing them to stay off the radar of oppressive regimes. With companies 
like Ning and others providing such a powerful, low cost social media option, the social 
media environment will continue to grow and evolve. These platforms can be viewed as a 
type of cover and concealment among the virtual operating environment. Following this 
overview of how the Internet and social media platforms function, the author refers to 
Figure 4 which is a model  to facilitate the understanding of the competitive environment 
that is social media. 
 
Figure 4.  A Model of Select Communications Platforms  
Just as military service members use maps to help visualize and understand the 
physical terrain in which they will operate, those working in the cyber domain will be 
aided in their understanding of the social media environment by studying a graphical 
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representation of that environment. Figure 4 is a model designed for that purpose. The 
model is comprised of seven basic parts. The three principle components are labeled with 
various symbols described in the legend. The four other components of the model are 
labeled “A” through “D” and a brief description of each is contained within the model 
itself. 
Section A represents the Internet as a whole including social media and websites 
of both a political and non-political nature. Examples include business websites, financial 
websites, news websites, websites about sports, leisure activities, or the weather. Section 
B is a representation of Internet content, excluding social media sites, that is monitored, 
censored, or blocked by the ruling regime. Some of the same types of Web content 
included in Section A would be included in Section B. The difference, though, is that the 
content in Section B is of concern to the regime. If foxnews.com were blocked by the 
Iranian government, it would fall into Section B. Section C includes all regime 
controlled, non-Internet based communications platforms and channels. Examples 
include state run television programming, radio stations, magazines, and newspapers. 
Section D of the model represents all non-Internet based communications platforms that 
insurgents use either outside of the regime’s control or not monitored by the state. 
Examples include underground newspapers, pirate radio stations, citizens band (CB) 
radio, and informational pamphlets. The three principle sections, represented by the 
symbols in the legend, are all social media based and form the heart of the model. 
The triangle represents the social media platforms that are used by the insurgents, 
but which are not actively monitored by the state. Examples of social media sites that 
would fall into this section include Wael Ghonim’s Facebook page, “We are all Khaled 
Said,” and the website Goodreads.com. That Facebook page was a key website for the 
organization and mobilization of Egyptian citizens who wanted to protest against the 
Mubarak regime. Goodreads.com is a social networking website that is designed for book 





problems with the Iranian regime. This website was not on the Regime’s censored list 
until a story by the Los Angeles Times exposed how the Iranian dissidents were using the 
website.36  
The example demonstrates how the model can change as Goodreads.com once fit 
into the triangle space (an unmonitored social media platform used by insurgents), but 
was pushed into the circle space (monitored/censored social media platforms). Another 
example of social media websites that insurgents could use that would not be monitored 
or censored are newly created sites that utilize turnkey solutions such as those provided 
by Ning mentioned above. However, the problem with using a new social media website 
is getting enough users so that information disseminated on the site gains widespread 
readership. An insurgent group could have the most powerful video content, yet if viewed 
by only a few people, it basically would have no power to influence others. The circle 
section represents social media that is actively monitored and censored (or blocked) by 
the state.   
In Iran, popular social media websites such as Facebook and Twitter are blocked 
by the government. Thus, Facebook and Twitter are examples of social media sites that 
would fall into the area represented by the circle for the country of Iran. The last section 
of the model is represented by an X and is the social media space that is being censored 
by the state, but also being used by dissidents, and is thus contested. An example of 
contested social media space is the Chinese social media website Sina Weibo.   
Sina Weibo is China’s most popular micro-blogging site with over 500 million 
users. However, the Chinese government actively monitors the accounts of over 300,000 
users who have at least 1,000 followers.37 This influential group is closely watched, and 
if something posted on the Sina Weibo network is not approved by the Chinese 
                                                 
36 Evgeny Morozov, “How Dictators Watch Us on the Web,” Prospect Magazine, November 18, 
2009, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/how-dictators-watch-us-on-the-web (accessed 
November 21, 2012). 
37 The Economist, “Monitoring the Monitors,” The Economist, July 10, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2012/07/online-censorship (accessed November 20, 2012). 
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government, the comments are deleted from the network almost immediately.38 So on 
one hand, China has banned social media sites like Facebook and Twitter, but on the 
other hand, China allows its citizens to use social media via sites like Sina Weibo. The 
caveat of course is that the Chinese government is very conscientious in monitoring the 
“approved” social media websites. Thus, the most active, popular users of social media in 
China play a cat and mouse game with the government censors, thereby making sites like 
Sina Weibo contested space in the social media model.   
With this explanation of how social media sites actually function, and exploration 
of a model that represents the competitive environment, the author will discuss 
technologies used to control information on the Internet and social media websites. This 
information is summarized in Table 1. One important consideration is that all of these 
censorship tools are only necessary when the regime in question does not have 
jurisdiction over the website that is hosting the prohibited content. If the website host is 
located in the censoring regime’s purview, the government can simply order the content 
removed. These tools come into play when the website is located outside of a regime’s 
jurisdiction. 
                                                 
38 Economist, “Monitoring the Monitors.” 
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Table 1.   Internet Censorship Tools 
C. TECHNOLOGIES FOR CENSORING, MONITORING, AND LOCATING 
In 1985, then U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz proposed a concept he called 
the dictator’s dilemma. The idea was that totalitarian leaders must choose between 
allowing citizens to access and use newly developed communication technologies, thus 
accepting the potential these tools have to subvert their authority, or to block access to 
these platforms and suffer the inevitable economic slow-down.39  The recent events in 
North Africa and the Middle East point to a digital dilemma which is forcing dictatorial 
leaders to make the same kind of choice outlined by Mr. Shultz.   
As the world witnessed in Egypt, some leaders are willing to suffer economic and 
public relations damage to try to stop popular uprisings. In order to deter, prevent, and 
ultimately stop insurgent activity, governments utilize a variety of means to control 
content on the Internet. In particular, social media content and platforms are singled out 
for censorship. Before examining the particular techniques that are used to control 
                                                 
39 Hal Roberts, Ethan Zuckerman, and John Palfrey, “2011 Circumvention Tool Evaluation,” Berkman 
Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications/2011/2011_Circumvention_Tool_Evaluation (accessed 
November 10, 2012), 1. 
Name of Filter How It Works Advantages Disadvantages
IP Block Filters Require very little computing power Technique is very blunt; blocks entire addresses
Can be used on all backbone connections in a country Cannot block individual stories on a given web site
DNS Block Filters
Keyword Block Filters
Can be bypassed with simple encrpytion
Cannot be used against non-text data
Search Results Removals Costs the requesting government nothing
Risk of public backlash if requests are made public
Internet Shut Downs Effective at preventing the use of social media Causes world-wide backlash
Blocks the DNS names of offending web 
sites.  A DNS name is the plain text 
name (google) of an IP address.
A government simply requests that 
search providers such as Google omit 
certain search results when specific 
words are phrases are searched for
If search provider agrees to censor search results, this 
technique can be very effective
Completely reliant on search companies in order for 
this to work
Can be used on any data application; web pages, 
emails, IMs, etc
A government shuts off access to the 
Internet Can do more harm than good to the government in 
power
Unlike an IP Block filter, if two individual web sites 
are co-hosted on the same IP address, a DNS 
blocker can block one web site, but not the second 
Typically involves "overblocking" like IP Block 
filters, as individual stories cannot be blocked
Examines content of data traffic, looking 
for a specific URL or offending 
keywords in emails, etc.
Much more precise compared to IP and Keyword 
block filters; can block msn.com/politics, while not 
blocking msn.com/sports for example
Very expensive to implement, must examine entire 
streams of digital content, not just short destination 
Internet Censorship Tools
1. Social Filters:        A citizens own self censorship; combined with political filters, it is a powerful tool
2. Legal Filters:    The laws and regulations a country imposes on its citizen's use of the Internet      
3. Technical Filters: The technical means a government uses to censor the Interenet; there are multiple examples
Blocks the IP address of an individual 
computer or server making the machine 
inaccessible If two individual web sites are co-hosted on the 
same IP address, both sites will be blocked
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information on the Internet, the thesis will discuss the basic points of connectivity that a 
government can manipulate in order to control the content that its citizens view when 
using the Internet. By building in features to control Internet connectivity, a government 
gains control of the key social media terrain. 
D. CENSORING THE INTERNET—A GOVERNMENT’S ATTEMPT TO 
CONTROL KEY TERRAIN 
A filter can operate on various Internet connection points. Examples include the 
actual client’s machine which is requesting data, the server designated to return the 
requested data, or the network between the client and the server during either the initial 
request or during the response.40 Client-side filtering is not a truly viable option, as it 
would require placing software inside every browser on every computer (easily 
circumvented by installing new browsers). Server side filtering can work, but it requires 
the hosting content owner to provide active support to the government’s request that 
certain content on the Internet be filtered in their county.41  Alternatively, the servers 
could be attacked using tactics such as a denial of service attack. The third place for 
filtering are locations such as routers and DNS servers that help deliver content to users. 
Because the majority of Internet data travels on a relatively small number of huge 
backbone data pipes (before being routed off onto small regional network pipes), filtering 
countries will typically input large lists of prohibited keywords onto those Internet routers 
that control the data flow on the backbone data pipes.42 These routers then block data that 
contains the blacklisted keywords.  
Ultimately, most filtering countries use a combination of social, legal, and 
technical filtering methods, which are described in detail below. The most aggressive 
Internet filtering countries, such as China, will use a combination of overlapping 
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methods. The first two types, social and legal, are means by which the government tries 
to prevent its citizens from accessing certain Internet content. These types of filters can 
be considered the obstacles within the social media environment.  
1. Social Filters—Obstacles 
Although at first glance it seems counter-intuitive, the most powerful filters of 
Internet content are not powerful computers with technically advanced software, rather 
they are the citizenry’s own self-imposed restraints in not trying to access forbidden 
information.43 This social pressure prevents the vast majority of people living in 
countries that censor the Internet from going to websites or searching for information 
about topics that are forbidden. This unfortunate circumstance, combined with the effort 
and technical knowledge needed to use circumvention tools, is often all that is needed to 
prevent people from accessing information on the Internet. If social pressures fail, legal 
pressures serve as the next line of defense against a citizen’s ability to freely surf the 
Web. 
2. Legal Filters—Obstacles 
Political pressure is normally applied through a country’s laws and regulations. 
Although arrests for accessing restricted information on the Internet is not commonplace, 
the mere threat of being  arrested for accessing certain websites or content on the Internet 
is often enough pressure to prevent people from trying. Additionally, in countries like 
China, businesses that provide Internet access are under close surveillance by government 
authorities. Still further, many Internet cafes in China are required to request and record 
an Internet user’s credentials.44 These additional obstacles make it more difficult for 
Internet café users to access information that the government does not approve of and 
helps the government keep known political dissidents under careful watch.   
Technology such as radio, television, newspapers, and even the Internet itself, 
allows the government to communicate which types of information its citizens should 
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avoid. Putting this information out to the masses creates the first two types of filters, 
social and legal. Then, if these both fail, the technical filters (actual blocking) kick in to 
prevent individuals from accessing restricted content.45 
3. Technical Filters—Observation and Fields of Fire 
Technical filters represent the first letter in the OAKOC framework, observation 
and fields of fire. They allow a repressive government to “see” the social media 
environment. Whether it is setting up fake proxy sites, or actively monitoring social 
media users with over 1,000 followers, such as in China, the hardware and software used 
to monitor and censor Internet users gives the regime a means to observe where an 
insurgent might maneuver within this competitive landscape. These filters serve as the 
first and last lines of defense against unwanted information getting into the hands of 
citizens living in countries that want to control the information its citizenry reads. There 
are a multitude of technical filters, the most prominent of which are discussed in the 
following subsections. 
a. IP Block Filters 
The most straightforward and basic means of blocking traffic on a router 
(and thus the Internet) is to block the IP addresses (the number used to identify each 
specific machine on the Internet) of servers hosting the information that a government 
wants blocked.46  Basically, once a machine’s IP address is blocked, it becomes 
inaccessible. This method is simple, requires very little computer power, and can be used 
on a large scale. The drawback is that it blocks everything at a given site. Individual 
stories on a specific site cannot be blocked using this method. It is either “all or nothing.” 
Still worse, some Web hosting firms actually combine hundreds of individual websites 
onto a single IP address. Therefore, when the offending website shares an IP address with  
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other websites, even completely unrelated ones, all of those websites will be blocked. 
This makes IP block filters the equivalent of a sledgehammer, as opposed to a surgical 
tool, when it comes to Internet filtering.   
b. DNS Filters 
The DNS filters block looking up specific domain names (google.com or 
foxnews.com, for example). To block specific name lookups, a government need only 
send a list of domain names to block to each DNS server operating in that particular 
country. Like IP filtering, DNS filters block entire domains. A specific news story on 
msn.com cannot be blocked without blocking the entire msn.com domain. However, if 
two sites are co-hosted by a server with the same IP address, DNS blocking can block 
one without blocking the other. So, msn.com could be blocked while foxnews.com could 
remain unblocked, even if both sites were hosted on the same IP address. This is one 
advantage of DNS filters over IP address blocking.47 From the government’s point of 
view, however, DNS filters may not be the most effective means of preventing citizens 
from accessing certain websites because a client computer can either be configured to use 
DNS servers in an outside, non-filtered country, or use a non-filtered DNS server inside 
the country that is doing the filtering.  
c. Keyword Filters 
Keyword filters go a step further than both IP filters and DNS filters. 
Keyword filters actually examine the content of the data traffic between clients and 
servers. Further, they can look at content in any part of the requested data, be it a specific 
uniform resource locator (URL) in a Web request or an offensive word/phrase in an 
email.48  This capability allows keyword filters to be much more precise. So, for 
example, www.espn.com/football can be blocked while www.espn.com/baseball  may be 
transmitted freely. Also, specific phrases deemed offensive to the filtering government, 
“Taiwan independence” in China for example, can be blocked using a keyword block 
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filter. The downside to this technology is that it is much more expensive compared to IP 
filtering and DNS filtering. Just as other filtering techniques, keyword filters can be 
circumvented.   
Internet users can prevent filtration by keyword blockers by using 
encryption on all data that is sent over the Internet. However, this technique only works 
with hyper-text transfer protocol with secure sockets layer (HTTPS) sites that support 
SL/TLS. Additionally, non-text data is basically impossible to filter via keyword filters.49 
In addition to these technical means of filtering Internet content, governments use other 
means to control the flow of information to their people. 
4. Search Results Removals 
A transparency report from search engine company Google indicates that dozens 
of governments, even the United States and other western democracies, are requesting 
that Google censor or block certain Web pages from populating a user’s search requests. 
For example, government regulators in Spain asked Google to omit 270 different search 
results that linked to articles and blogs that referenced various public figures, including 
mayors and prosecutors. Poland sent Google a request to remove links to websites that 
criticized several unnamed public institutions. Various United States government 
agencies requested a total of 6,192 pieces of Internet content be removed from search 
results, blog posts, or archives of online videos during the second half of 2011, up 718 
percent from the six months just prior.50  
5. Content Removals 
In addition to search result removals, governments can ask companies to remove 
content that they host. One such request came from Canadian officials, who asked 
Google, the owner of YouTube, to delete a YouTube video that showed a Canadian 
citizen urinating on his passport and then flushing it down the toilet. Regardless of the 
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requesting government, or the subject of the request, the overall trend of governments 
asking Google and content providers to censor search results or delete content is on the 
rise. These requests are simply another option in a government’s arsenal of censorship 
tools.   
6. Shut-Downs  
In the event that all other methods and technologies fail, a governing body can 
choose to simply cut off Internet access to its people. The government of Myanmar, for 
example, shut off access to the Internet completely when it found out citizens were 
reporting on the Saffron Revolution. These protests were fueled by the government’s 
decision to double the price of petrol and diesel, while increasing the price of compressed 
natural gas (which powers public buses) by five-fold.51  This was crude but effective in 
preventing many pictures and videos from the protests from making it to mainstream  
media outlets.52  
The Chinese government, while never completely shutting down the Internet in 
the entire country, did shut down the Internet in Xinjiang province for 10 months 
between 2009 and 2010 to help subdue the riots in Urumqi.53 These riots were the result 
of ethnic tensions between the Muslim Uighurs and the Han Chinese, which highlighted 
the deep seated frustrations felt by numerous minority groups in western China.54 A 
third, and probably the most infamous example of a government going to this extreme 
measure to gain control of the Internet occurred in Egypt during the Arab Spring.  
The Mubarak regime, fearful of the growing volume of social media-based 
protests, cut off all communications in Egypt on January 29, 2011. Not only did the 
regime “pull the plug” on the Internet, it also shut down all three cellular telephone 
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operators and all short messaging services (SMS).55  This action ultimately ended up 
being counter-productive in that it brought awareness to the masses that a challenge to the 
regime was taking place and signaled to the people that it was time to go into the streets 
in protest. The situation in Egypt provides an excellent example of how much power the 
Internet inherently holds, and how dictatorial leaders fear the free flow of information to 
their citizens.  
In the overall examination of government’s efforts to censor the Internet, it is the 
combination of social, political, and technical filtering that proves most effective. These 
means, and the continued increase in removing search results from major search engines, 
are effective in preventing the vast majority of citizens living under repressive regimes 
from freely accessing information. Therefore, despite the fact that most circumvention 
tools can overcome technical filters, the vast majority of citizens living in countries that 
censor the Internet are effectively prevented from viewing prohibited content.56  
Understanding how Internet filters work, and more importantly to the insurgent, 
figuring out which Internet controls their particular government is utilizing, is important 
because from this information, an insurgent group can develop a plan on how to 
circumvent these government efforts. Additionally, this information will assist a 
revolutionary to determine the best ways in which to utilize social media, given their 
understanding of the specific social media environment that they will be operating in. 
Many of the conditions that make up the realities of a specific country’s digital 
environment are created by the various means a country implements to repress the free 
flow of information to their citizens. Therefore, the better an insurgent understands the 
social media environment, the better he or she will navigate within the environment. In 
addition to censoring social media platforms and the Internet, governments also conduct 
cyber-based surveillance. 
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E. SURVEILLANCE—OBSERVATION AND FIELDS OF FIRE 
Governments, and those that oppose governments, have the ability to conduct 
surveillance of the opposing side using a number of methods and tools for collection. 
Additionally, each side has the ability to collect various types of data that can provide 
greater situational awareness about their opponent. Examples of the types of data that can 
be collected using cyber-based tools include real-time communications (Internet traffic, 
mobile phone calls, SMS messages, hidden microphones and video cameras), 
communication headers from digital message traffic (the to/from of an email message for 
example), relational data derived from social networks (open source information gained 
from various social media websites), the content stored either online or on a user’s 
hardware, billing data, and locational data.57 Additionally, there are five principle cyber-
surveillance methods. These methods are open source collection, client/customer/visitor 
(CCV) tracking, remote monitoring, communications intercepts, and data requests and 
seizures.58  
Open-source collection refers to looking for information on platforms that are 
available to the public and are unclassified in nature. Examples include social media 
websites such as Facebook and Twitter. The types of data available from these well-
known platforms can include locational information, especially when users allow their 
created content to be geo-enabled. An example of this type of data collection can be 
found by examining the software called Creepy. Creepy allows a user to quickly obtain 
geolocation aggregator data.59 The easy-to-use software provides the location (on Google 
Maps) of social media users who share their locations. The only data needed to obtain 
this information is the user name of a person’s Twitter or Flickr account.  The CCV 
tracking involves collecting the data that is captured when someone visits a website.  
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Powerful (and often free) software allows website owners to collect a wealth of data on 
individuals when a person visits a website, including information about the user’s 
browser, operating system, and IP address.  
Also, the products and services that people use, including mobile phones, tablets, 
and computers, may provide a wealth of information to their vendors. All of this data 
collected by site owners and vendors could be turned over to a government on demand. 
Remote monitoring involves watching, listening, and/or recording the activities of a 
person or group using assets that do not require physical proximity to the target of the 
surveillance effort. This type of monitoring can be done in a number of ways. Software 
can be installed on computers that allows a person’s webcam to be turned on and 
controlled from afar.  
Crowdsourcing is another technique for conducting remote monitoring. In the 
United Kingdom, for example, paid members can watch participating store’s in-store 
security cameras to try to catch shoplifters. The Border Sheriff’s Coalition in Texas 
allows closed circuit television cameras to be watched by civilians, who can report 
suspicious activities on the border. Another example is the PlaceRaider application for 
Android phones. This software can turn on a person’s mobile phone camera and provide 
a three dimensional model of the phone’s surroundings as well as provide close-up 
images.60  
There are a number of ways to conduct communication intercepts. These methods 
include placing taps in telecommunications switches or in the routers that control the 
flow of information on the Internet.61  Also, signals can be captured both in the air and 
over communication lines. Remote access software can be installed on a target’s 
computer which will allow information to be retrieved from the computer. Another 
method is to simply plant microphones or other listening devices on a target’s devices.  
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The fifth method of cyber surveillance is through data requests and seizures. This 
method involves states forcing service providers to provide digital records of their users. 
A typical seizure could involve the gathering of emails, SMS messages, call logs, or Web 
logs. 
Having discussed how governments try to control information on the Internet, and 
how governments conduct cyber-surveillance, the author will now examine the ways to 
circumvent these efforts. Circumvention technologies and techniques comprise the final 
letter in the OAKOC framework, cover and concealment. The various ways in which an 
insurgent can navigate or act within the social media environment represent the 
camouflage of this competitive space. Some of the most common circumvention 
technologies are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.   Circumvention Tools 
F. CIRCUMVENTION TECHNOLOGIES—COVER AND CONCEALMENT 
The idea that it is important to have free media expression in closed societies is 
not new. Efforts to this end include Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. These two 
Name of Proxy Advantages Disadvantages Software Required?
HTTP Operator can use browser transparently Requires trust in proxy operator Yes (or manual configuration  of browser)
Multiple non-circumvention related uses of HTTP proxies Users have to contiually seek out new HTTP proxies
Public HTTP proxies generally do not provide encryption
Detectable changes are left behind on a users computer
CGI No trace of use left behind on users computer Requires trust in proxy operator No
Can be used on public / locked computers (library, café, etc) Requires an alternate browser within a browser
Circumvention exposed if wrong URL window is used
Typically does not provide encryption
IP Tunneling Operator can use browser transparently Requires trust in proxy operator Yes  
Multiple non-circumvention related uses of IP Tunnels
Supports more than web browsing: email, IM, file sharing
Can be created multiple ways: VPNs, SSH, & HTTP Tunnels
Re-Routing Can use browser transparently once software is installed High cost to use and establish Yes
Does not require trust in system operator-uses multiple proxies Requires a lot of bandwidth to operate
Data is encypted at each individual proxy Generally slow performance compared to other methods
Distributed Hosting Stores multiple copies of data requests on multiple servers Requires trust in proxy operator Yes (or manual configuration  of browser)
Can use browser transparently once software is installed No distributed hosting systems developed for end users
Provides redundency is the primary server is attacked or down
Circumvention Tools
1. Encryption:     Basic purpose is to hide digital content
2. Proxies:           Basic purpose is to hide the desitination of a data request; there are multiple types
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radio stations played a significant role in ending state communism in the Soviet Union.62 
Building on this lineage, digital communication technology, especially social media 
technology and the potential it brings to communicating with the masses, has 
reinvigorated the call to push for free media expression across the globe. On the other 
side of the coin, dictatorial leaders have also recognized the potential that social media 
has on ultimately deciding who wins the battle of the narrative. Therefore, it is important 
for those working for freedom of information to find ways to keep the lines of 
communication open on the Internet. The next few sections of this chapter will focus on 
the technological aspects of accessing information on the Internet when a state entity is 
trying to prevent unfiltered access to the Internet. These technologies will fall under the 
categorical title of circumvention tools. 
All circumvention methods use some combination of hiding the content 
(encryption) and/or the destination (proxies) of digital information.63 Most simply, 
proxies conceal destinations and encryption conceals content. Circumvention tools work 
by allowing users to bypass Internet filtering and access blocked content. Although there 
are multiple types of circumvention tools such as Web proxies, virtual private networks 
(VPNs), and HTTP/SOCKS proxies, they all provide connections to Internet sites that 
would otherwise be blocked.64 Another way to view circumvention tools is to 
conceptualize them as virtual ISPs, which reroute an Internet user’s traffic around a 
government’s blocking filters.65 An example of a very basic proxy service will make the 
idea behind circumvention technology easy to understand. 
A user in China who cannot reach http://falundafa.org directly can instead 
access a proxy machine like http://superproxy.com/, which can fetch 
http://falundafa.org for the user. The network filter only sees a connection  
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to the proxy machine (superproxy.com), and so long as the proxy itself 
remains unfiltered, the user can visit sites through the proxy that are 
otherwise blocked by the network filter.66 
In general, most circumvention tools work as intended, but there are some drawbacks. If, 
for example, China decides to block the proxy site (superproxy.com in the above 
example), then any requests sent through the proxy will not work.   
Despite the advantages that proxy technologies (and other circumvention tools) 
bring to Internet users, there are some serious concerns and drawbacks that must be 
considered before using these technologies. These considerations will be fully explored 
later in the chapter, but as an example, using a proxy requires double the bandwidth 
compared to a non-proxy connection. This may not impact users in the United States 
much, but in less developed parts of the world, bandwidth is a major factor to consider in 
understanding the social media environment. Also, most circumvention tools (Tor being a 
notable exception) require users to place a high amount of trust in the tool’s developers, 
as the developers could share, lose, or sell user data to potentially dangerous third parties 
(including a repressive regime).67 Finally, in trying to understand the role that 
circumvention tools play within the social media environment, one must keep in mind 
that there are no absolutes in either filtering (by the state) or circumvention (by 
dissidents). It is a resource battle between the two sides, and the landscape is constantly 
evolving.  
Another interesting aspect to this topic is that in countries with aggressive Internet 
filtering, there are not a lot of people using circumvention tools. A 2009 research report 
estimated that only two percent of all Internet users in countries where filters are in place 
used circumvention tools.68  One reason for this low percentage is that social pressure to 
avoid known, prohibited websites is a powerful filter in and of itself. This, combined with 
the initial burden to actually acquire, implement, and use a circumvention tool, serves as 
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a deterrent. Other reasons that explain this low usage rate include the fact that some of 
the tools do not work as well as advertised, governments keep circumvention tools off 
search provider search results, and circumvention tool users can face incarceration.69  
This is an important consideration for SOF personnel who are conducting UW.  The 
training provided to the insurgents they are supporting may need to include how to use 
circumvention tools.  
A follow up of the 2009 study, published in October, 2010, solidified the findings 
of the initial report in that in the roughly two years between the studies, the percent of all 
Internet users utilizing circumvention tools in countries that filter content rose to only 
three percent.70  Another key finding of this later study is that most users only utilize 
simple Web proxies, and not more sophisticated and potentially more effective 
circumvention tools. This situation appears to be occurring because users are entering 
simple search terms such as “proxy” in their search engines, which overwhelmingly 
return lists of simple Web proxies or HTTP/SOCKS. Additionally, people in countries, 
such as China, with aggressive Internet filtering systems, may simply prefer websites 
written in their native language, by other Chinese people, about subjects that directly 
affect their local communities.71 
Despite this relatively low percentage of users, it is important to understand that it 
only takes a select group of people who are highly connected socially in their local 
communities for the impact of circumvention tools to be significantly magnified. 
Bestselling author Malcolm Gladwell calls these types of highly connected people 
connectors, mavens, or salesmen.72 Thus, if a core cadre of users can distribute 
information they find by using circumvention tools to access otherwise blocked websites, 
or they post information on websites for the world to see, then the effect is basically that 
of a larger number of Internet users utilizing circumvention tools in Internet filtering 
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countries.73 This is the idea championed by Professor Xiao Qiang, who teaches that a 
small number of internationally connected activists can be extremely effective by using 
their highly connected status to disseminate key information through local networks. 
These individuals, therefore, can act as social bridges or the information brokers between 
the international community and their local neighborhoods.74  
Following is more detail about circumventing Internet filtering. The two principle 
ways are encryption and proxies. There are several proxy methods. These include HTTP 
proxies, CGI proxies, IP tunneling, re-routing, and distributed hosting.  
1. HTTP Proxy 
An HTTP proxy is a software tool that allows an Internet user to use his or her 
existing browser transparently. That is, the user will not notice a difference in how the 
browser looks or operates. Basically, an HTTP proxy acts as a middleman between a 
requesting client and a destination server. The HTTP proxies take requests from their 
clients and hold them. The proxy server then sends what appears to be an independent 
request to the ultimate destination server, and then returns the response from the 
destination server to the client. Therefore, it appears that no communications has 
occurred between the client and the final destination server. A person wanting to use the 
Internet anonymously must be careful using HTTP proxies because a resourceful 
government could put up its own public proxies for the purposes of spying on its 
citizens.75 This would be an example of government using technical tools to observe the 
social media environment. Also, most proxy sites do not provide encryption. However, 
circumvention tools that use an HTTP proxy avoid the aforementioned problem found in 
simple proxies. 
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First, circumvention tools that use HTTP proxies automate the process of locating 
HTTP proxy sites that are not blocked and then configuring a user’s Internet browser to 
use the unblocked HTTP proxy.76 Second, the majority of circumvention tools that utilize 
HTTP proxies actually host their own proxy servers. This means that users of the 
circumvention tool can trust the proxy server as much as they trust the developer of the 
actual circumvention tool. Finally, most circumvention tools that use HTTP proxies will 
only connect to proxy servers that are encrypted. This means that the tools can 
circumvent surveillance and keyword filtering.77  
In wrapping up the discussion of HTTP proxies, it is important to note that using 
an HTTP filter on a computer leaves detectable changes on the user’s computer. This 
means that a confiscated computer that has been using an HTTP filter will contain 
evidence of its use. This is an important consideration for SOF personnel who are using 
this type of proxy on a computer while in a denied area. Also, it must be remembered that 
HTTP proxy programs can only be trusted as far as one is comfortable trusting the 
operator of the proxy server.78  
2. Common Gateway Interface (CGI) Proxy 
A CGI proxy works by using an alternate Web browser within an existing Web 
browser. Typically, a CGI proxy appears as a second URL address bar under a user’s 
normal URL address bar. To use the CGI proxy, one must remember to use the correct 
address bar, otherwise there will be no proxy function. Although this sounds simple in 
concept, it is easy for someone to mistakenly access the Web through the incorrect 
address bar and inadvertently give out location information.79 
The CGI proxies work by taking a client’s request and embedding it in the data 
portion of an HTTP request.80 This embedded request goes to the CGI proxy server. 
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After this, the CGI proxy server finds the final destination information, sends out what 
appears to be its own data request, and then returns the appropriate data to the user of the 
CGI proxy.  
The CGI proxy users experience similar problems to HTTP proxy users. The CGI 
proxy sites are always at risk of being blocked, they lack encryption, and require a user to 
trust the proxy host.81 Despite these potential problems, CGI proxies do not require 
clients to install any software on their Web browsers. This means that no trace of 
software is left behind on a user’s computer. Additionally, CGI proxies can be used on 
locked computers such as those in a library, Internet café, or university setting. Thus, CGI 
proxies may be a superior option for U.S. SOF personnel using social media technology 
while abroad.   
3. IP Tunneling 
Unlike a CGI proxy, IP tunneling does require the installation of client side 
software.82  However, IP tunneling allows clients to use their normal Web browsers in a 
transparent method. Another advantage of IP tunneling is that it can be used for more 
than just Web traffic in terms of its circumvention function. There are basically three 
types of technologies used for IP tunneling. These technologies include virtual private 
networks (VPNs), HTTP tunnels, and secure shell (SSH) tunnels.  
The VPNs are primarily designed to connect remote clients to private intranets. 
For example, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) allows students to connect to the 
school’s online, intranet resources from home by logging into the NPS VPN. What this 
connection does, in addition, is to give a user an Internet connection that originates from 
the VPN host as opposed to the location of the client.83 So for the purposes of 
revolutionary type activity, a user that is located in a filtering country, but is connecting 
to a VPN that is located in a non-filtering country, can access the Internet as if there were 
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no filters in place. Even better, a VPN provides circumvention for all types of IP 
applications. These applications include emailing, instant messaging, and file sharing.84  
The one glaring down-side of using VPNs (from an insurgent’s point of view) is that they 
are relatively easy to identify. Therefore, VPNs are easily blocked. Thus, VPNs may be 
more effective in countries with less sophisticated censoring and surveillance capabilities.  
An HTTP tunnel works like a standard HTTP/HTTPS request and response 
mechanism. Because of this feature, HTTP tunneling appears like normal HTTP traffic. 
This makes it much more difficult to detect and block an HTTP tunnel as compared to a 
VPN. The downside to this technology is that a user’s Web browsing experience is 
typically much slower than that of a VPN.   
The primary use of SSH tunneling is to provide secure remote access to an end 
user. The most difficult aspect of SSH tunnels is that they require an individual tunnel for 
every remote machine the user needs access to. Therefore, SSH tunnels are not very 
practical for Web browsing purposes.85  They are good, however, for tasks such as 
consistent/efficient secure file sharing between two computers.  
4. Re-Routing 
Like other proxy methods, a re-routing proxy functions by routing a request for 
data through a non-filtered location (or locations in the case of a re-route proxy). Also, a 
re-routing proxy requires that a user install client-side software. Once the software is 
installed, the user can use his or her Web browser in a transparent manner. A key 
distinction between a re-routing proxy and the three previously discussed proxies (HTTP, 
CGI, and IP tunneling), is that all of the others require that a user place trust in the host of 
the proxy. This is always a concern because even if the proxy host is trustworthy, the host 
may be legally forced to divulge private data at any time.   
A noteworthy advantage of a re-routing proxy is that it significantly decreases the 
amount of trust that one must place in the proxy host. The reason for this is that a re-
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routing proxy actually routes the data through multiple proxy servers. Further, at each 
proxy, the data that is being transferred is encrypted.86  This means that a single proxy 
server knows the immediate sources of the data and the next server the data is going to, 
but not the ultimate destination and the originating source. Therefore, a re-routing proxy 
user need only trust that the multiple proxy servers will not communicate and share data 
with each proxy in the chain of communication. So trust must be placed in the system as 
a whole, but not on individual proxy servers. Despite this added layer of security, re-
routing proxy servers are still vulnerable to attack, and the revelation of the location of 
the proxy user. 
If an entity, such as a state government, can correlate the time of the requests, 
where the origin of the request is known but the destination is not, and can correlate the 
responses, where the destination of the request is known but the origin is not, the state 
can learn both the origin and destination of a given set of data.87 The key prerequisite for 
this scenario to be possible is that both the requesting user and the responding server 
must be physically located in the country that is doing the filtering. This means that a re-
routing client is only at risk for detection if the client is browsing Internet sites that are 
located within the filtering country. A second key point is that the technology needed to 
do this type of two-way search is prohibitively expensive even for a government, 
especially when there are a large number of re-routing users.88 
Another disadvantage to re-routing systems is that they require large amounts of 
bandwidth to operate. This, of course, makes running a re-routing proxy system 
expensive to operate. Each proxy in a re-routing system costs the same amount of money 
to operate as a single proxy server in one of the single proxy systems. Therefore, the 
operator of a three proxy re-routing proxy system must pay three times as much as the 
operator of a single proxy system. Using the assumption that there is a fixed amount of 
money to spend on a proxy system, the performance of a re-routing proxy system is 
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roughly equal to the inverse of the number of individual servers in the system (a two 
server system would have one half the performance of a single server system, a three 
server system would have one third the performance, and so on).89  
G. DISTRIBUTED HOSTING 
A distributed hosting proxy system provides multiple copies of data across 
multiple participating servers. Each individual server in the system has the ability to serve 
the requested data content to a client upon request. At its core, a distributed hosting proxy 
system is a caching HTTP proxy that has been optimized to store a large amount of the 
same data across different servers.90 This type of proxy requires either the manual 
configuration of a client’s Web browser or the installation of client side software for it to 
work.  The obvious advantage of this system is that a user can still receive requested data 
even after the original server has been shut down. The original server may have been the 
victim of a directed denial of service attack, overwhelmed by sheer volume of requests, 
or may simply have experienced a malfunction. Either way, a distributed hosting proxy 
system can still get the needed data to the requesting client. Despite these advantages, it 
is important to note that no one has developed a distributed hosting system with 
circumvention as its primary intended use.91  
By knowing about the various circumvention tool options, how each functions, 
and the relative advantages and disadvantages of each, a SOF operator will be able to 
better advise insurgents on using the best circumvention tools in terms of security, 
anonymity, functionality, cost, ease of use, and speed. This will allow an insurgent 
network to select the best circumvention tool for the specific social media environment in 
which it will be operating. Now that the various means to circumvent a state’s attempts at 
blocking and/or monitoring Internet use has been examined, the thesis will look at the 
two principle proxy hosting models. 
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H. PROXY HOSTING METHODS 
Circumvention tools generally rely on either a centralized proxy server in which a 
firm hosts its own project or on volunteer peer hosting. There are advantages and 
disadvantages to each of these general methods. Centralized hosting requires a user to put 
trust and faith in the single host. For some potential clients, this may preclude their 
consideration for a centralized proxy server because of the higher risk of sensitive data 
being disclosed. Also, a centralized host represents a simple, linear relationship between 
the overall cost of providing a service, the performance of the system, and the total 
number of users. Therefore, increasing the performance of the system is simply a matter 
of increasing the amount of bandwidth and servers allocated to the system. However, this 
arrangement is much more costly to the individual project host as it bears the entire cost 
of the system. So, as the number of users goes up, so too does the amount of capital 
needed.  
Peer hosting systems, on the other hand, spread the trust a user must place in a 
circumvention tool to the volunteer servers. This could be a significant advantage 
compared to centralized systems for users wanting to ensure their data is kept 
confidential. Additionally, scaling a peer hosted system is less resource intensive as long 
as the number of volunteer hosts scales along with the total number of clients. One 
potential down-side to a peer hosting system is the freeloader issue. A freeloader is a 
client who only uses the tool but never volunteers to act as a host for the greater good of 
the community of users. A final potential issue with peer hosting systems is that most 
volunteer servers offer low, consumer level bandwidth. This means that the overall 
performance of a peer hosted system can be slow, even under light data loads.92  All of 
these circumvention tools are designed to allow individuals to use the Internet in a 
manner that allows them to remain anonymous.  There is, however, a cost to anonymity. 
When an Internet user wishes to remain anonymous, he or she can use Internet 
proxies, encrypt data requests, and re-route requests over multiple servers. All of these 
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techniques assist in keeping the ultimate origin and destination of a data request 
confidential. However, each of these tools incurs costs to the Internet user’s performance 
and usability. In addition, to truly hide a user’s IP address from the destination Web 
server, a tool used for remaining anonymous must also filter out Javascript, Java, 
Activex, and any other active content on the websites they are accessing. This is a 
requirement because a server with malicious intent can use these active content products 
to determine the real IP address of the user trying to connect.93 In a country trying to 
block access to circumvention tools, this information could identify an Internet user 
attempting to utilize a circumvention tool. 
Cookies can also be deadly kryptonite to Internet users wanting to remain 
anonymous because a complicit website can identify a person trying to access two 
different websites at the same time. Thus, a filtering regime could collect personal 
information from a user using an “approved” website, and then correlate that same 
personal information with the user’s visit to a fake website that would typically be 
accessed by a revolutionary (such as a website devoted to exposing regime corruption, for 
example). This situation represents a tradeoff that each circumvention tool developer 
must address. 
Although filtering out active content (JavaScript and others) and cookies is easily 
done and relatively cheap, it is very degrading in terms of maintaining a website’s 
functionality. Thus, it is important to consider the balance between filtering out the type 
of content that can take away a user’s anonymity at the cost of a website’s usability and 
functionality, and providing access to a fully functioning website, which may cost 
anonymity.94 Finding the right balance depends to a large degree on the type of user the 
circumvention tool is designed for, and on how aggressive and repressive the filtering 
country is where the user is located. For example, a person who is a well-known blogger  
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in a country with few such bloggers is much more visible, and therefore becomes a much 
bigger target of the government as compared to a blogger who is one of hundreds or 
thousands in a particular country.   
Whereas filtering and surveillance methods become prohibitively expensive in 
terms of trying to affect a large number of targets, when used against singletons, filtering 
and surveillance can be effective. Thus, a lone blogger might prefer anonymity over 
functionality, whereas a single blogger in an environment with a lot of other bloggers 
might prefer full functionality over increased anonymity. Again, individual circumstances 
will dictate the circumvention tools that are right for a given person and situation. To 
summarize, basic circumvention tools simply require that user requested data is 
encrypted, and that the request is redirected through an intermediate server which is 
located in a country that is not filtering the requested website. The difficulty lies in 
finding tools that provide anonymity and circumvention, while maintaining usability, 
security, the ability to avoid being blocked, and speed.95 
In concluding this section, it is important to remember that when operating in the 
cyber domain, especially on social media, it is critical for SOF operators to understand 
this virtual environment. This includes knowing how the regime in question censors, 
monitors, and conducts surveillance. It also includes knowing which circumvention tools 
will allow secure and anonymous communication.96  At the individual level, there are 
dozens of ways that a person can use Internet-based social media platforms as well as 
mobile phone-based social media platforms in a secure manner.97 Finally, caution is the 
key watchword when using social media in a UW environment. Users must always be 
aware of the possibilities that modern communications technology represents. As an 
example, some members of the U.S. Congress are concerned that Chinese cell phone 
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maker Huawei, which sells cell phones to populations in developing countries, may be 
installing software on its phones that would enable the Chinese government to spy on the 
Huawei phone users, as well as conduct other nefarious activities.98 
I. FUTURE TRENDS 
A key aspect of the social media environment is being able to connect to it. As 
previously discussed, connectivity represents the key terrain of the social media 
environment. An emerging technology that will potentially revolutionize this key terrain 
is a Wi-Fi antenna in a spray can!  It is possible to imagine rebel insurgents appearing to 
be spray painting or “tagging” a prominent public wall, bridge, or building. Instead of 
paint, however, the insurgents will be spraying a liquid filled with millions of nano-
capacitors that can receive radio signals. Furthermore, when paired with a basic router, 
Chamtech Enterprises’ (the company that is developing the Wi-Fi spray) spray antennas 
can communicate with a fiber network, receive signals from satellites, and be added to 
other networks. This means that an insurgent group could cheaply and easily create its 
own network of broadband Wi-Fi hot spots.99  This development could fundamentally 
alter the way the world thinks about Internet connectivity. Another emerging platform 
that could be especially effective in a UW environment is a social media tool called Vibe. 
Vibe is a social media platform that allows messages to be sent anonymously 
from a mobile phone to other mobile devices within a select physical radius. Also, the 
messages automatically will expire after a certain amount of time, which is a powerful 
feature for those wanting to communicate securely. This is different from social media 
platforms like Twitter and others that automatically store user generated content.100  
Also, unlike most social media platforms, Vibe does not require users to create an 
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account or even log in to its website. Although this tool was not originally designed for 
political protests, it was used by the demonstrators of the Occupy Wall Street movement 
as a quick and effective means of sharing important information in the local area.101 
Finally, the concept known as augmented reality will fundamentally alter the social 
media environment. 
Augmented reality refers to the intersection of the virtual world and physical 
world.102 An example that already exists lies in the robust internal computers found in a 
growing number of new cars. These built-in systems allow motor vehicle operators to 
access social media through voice commands. This includes having words converted into 
text messages and then sent out through a mobile phone that is linked via Bluetooth to the 
vehicle’s computer system. This increased convenience will come with a trade-off in 
terms of privacy and potential government monitoring and surveillance. The security 
implications of Google Glasses should be considered as well.  
Google Glasses enable wearers to access and interact with social networks and the 
Internet in general through a small screen that is positioned in front of the user’s eye. 
Based on where the person is located, Google Glasses can automatically push 
information to the user.103  This type of technology could potentially be used by 
governments in combination with facial recognition software, social media databases, and 
criminal databases to rapidly identify known dissidents simply by scanning a crowd. 
J. CONCLUSION 
 At the time this thesis is written, it is important to realize the social media 
landscape described throughout this chapter is not the same environment that will exist a 
year from now. The social media environment is constantly growing, evolving, and 
changing. One day, social media users prefer Myspace; the next month, this platform is 
obsolete. Smart phone users who once relied on text messaging for rapid communication 
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with peers now prefer Twitter. Those interested in understanding the social media 
environment must stay up to date on the latest technologies, and constantly challenge 
their own ways of thinking about and conceptualizing this growingly important domain. 
Social media has and will continue to help shape the outcome of future conflicts. 
Understanding the tools and technologies that facilitate social media conflict is critically 
important to successfully operating in this emerging terrain. 
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III. USING SOCIAL MEDIA IN CONFLICT 
Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) are charged with supporting the 
defense of the United States by executing nine core activities. These core activities 
include: unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), special 
reconnaissance (SR), counterterrorism (CT), security force assistance (SFA), 
counterinsurgency (COIN), direct action (DA), military support operations (MISO), and 
civil affairs operations (CAO). In addition to these nine core activities, ARSOF units 
have two additional secondary core activities: counterproliferation (CP) of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) and information operations (IO).104 With this type of diverse 
mission set, some would informally liken ARSOF to a Swiss Army knife, meaning 
ARSOF units are one tool that can perform many functions. In a similar manner, social 
media technology has been used in a multitude of ways to support various operations 
during periods of conflict across the globe. However, little systemic research exists on 
how to operationalize social media for various missions in a specific type of warfare.  
This chapter aims to fill this gap in the literature.  
To that end, it will provide an overview of how certain social media platforms and 
technologies have been used to assist in the execution of various types of operations, in 
different types of warfare. More specifically, the focus of this chapter will center on the 
use of social media to support unconventional warfare (UW)/insurgency warfare, 
counterterrorism (CT), and counter-insurgency (COIN) to achieve a range of desired end-
states ranging from disruption at the lower end of conflict to overthrowing/defeating a 
ruling regime or a major insurgent group at the upper end, depending on perspective. One 
important caveat is that the examples provided in the UW/Insurgency column are not 
case studies of UW. The examples are mostly of homespun insurrections. However, these  
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examples involve the same complexities a UW practitioner would encounter in a denied 
area and the aims of UW are the same as a revolutionary.105  Therefore, those planning a 
UW operation will find value in the examples provided. 
Table 3 provides an organizing framework for this chapter and summarizes the 
examples that will be discussed. In addition to providing examples for each of these nine 
combinations of a type of war and paired goal, additional cases will be provided which 
demonstrate how social media can also support other ARSOF core activities including CP 
of WMD, SFA, and IO. Of the examples used throughout the chapter, the Egyptian 
Revolution of 2011 (UW/Insurgency—Overthrow/Defeat) is singled out as the principle 
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Table 3.   Social Media’s Utilization in Conflict 
Before beginning the examination of specific uses of social media technology in 
conflict, the thesis will examine the origins of social media’s use during periods of 
 54 
struggle. Starting in late 2010 and continuing into the present, a wave of popular 
uprisings have spread across North Africa and the Middle East, resulting in regime 
changes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. These social revolutions, commonly 
referred to as the Arab Spring, fundamentally altered the way in which people connected 
to each other during periods of warfare. As such, researchers have devoted countless 
hours of study, examination, and analysis of the results and continuing struggles related 
to the Arab Spring.106    
One factor that has played some part in each of the countries affected by the Arab 
Spring has been the citizenry’s use of social media. A simple search engine query will 
return countless articles recalling how social media impacted the collective actions of 
thousands of protestors. In fact, most of the research seems to have been devoted to 
describing how social media empowers the average citizen with the ability to reach a vast 
audience in a very rapid manner. Additionally, it is important to note that social media 
has been used in conflict elsewhere. Examples can also be found in places like Iran, 
China, the Philippines, and Myanmar, and dates back to at least 2002, although the Arab 
Spring marks the beginning of the extensive use of social media as a tool of warfare. 
But just as social media can be used by groups of people to communicate, 
organize, and “get the story out,” so, too, can social media be used by various 
government entities to achieve their own objectives. This paper, within the framework 
provided in Table 3, aims to provide an overview of how various governments use social 
media, as well as how insurgent groups utilize social media in support of their own 
objectives. In doing so, it will highlight the competitive nature of social media where it 
does not inherently favor those wishing to disrupt the status quo (insurgents, criminals, 
terrorists,) or those wishing to maintain the status quo, namely the ruling power in a 
given nation. Additionally, these examples will provide the ARSOF planner with 
potential ways in which social media can be used to achieve future Department of 
Defense (DoD) objectives. From catching petty criminals to tracking nuclear warheads, 
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from the United States to Syria, governments and insurgents are only beginning to exploit 
the potential of using social media to help realize desired end states in times of conflict.   
A. UW / INSURGENCY—GOAL: DISRUPT 
To be clear, the uprisings that ultimately ended up toppling several regimes in the 
Middle East and North Africa should not be viewed as case studies in UW.107  These 
rather accidental revolutionaries were not reliant on an outside sponsor for the majority of 
their successes. Thus, they do not meet the doctrinal definition of an UW campaign. 
However, it is easy to conceptualize the Arab Spring uprisings as conflicts which could 
have been aided by direct assistance from ARSOF personnel. In this next example, 
though, it was not ARSOF operators who intervened to free an oppressed people. 
The likelihood of anyone outside immediate friends and family ever knowing the 
name Sidi Bouzid was highly unlikely.  However, when on December 17, 2010, Bouzid 
immolated himself in protest against police brutality and corruption in Tunisia, this single 
act sparked a wave of protest around Tunisia.108 Within two weeks protests broke out all 
over the country. A large number of those protestors utilized the Internet via social media 
platforms to inform, organize, and build support for their cause. The Ben Ali regime 
responded by blocking access to social media sites such as Facebook, censoring 
Wikileaks cables that were damaging to the regime, and even shooting and arresting 
protestors. 
In an unexpected turn of events, members of the “hacktivist” group Anonymous 
conducted distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks and defaced Tunisian government 
websites, helped spread media reports, provided proxy websites to allow Tunisians to 
remain connected, and helped Tunisian protestors remain undetected by the Tunisian 
government.109  Such DDOS attacks involve sending large amounts of useless data, in a 
                                                 
107 Petit, “Social Media,” 32–38. 
108 Quinn Norton, “Anonymous 101 Part Deux: Morals Triumph over Lulz,” Wired Magazine, 
December 30, 2011, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/12/anonymous-101-part-deux (accessed 
January 25, 2013). 
109 Ibid. 
 56 
short of amount of time, to a targeted website in order to prevent legitimate users from 
accessing the website. This action, along with the others mentioned above, was effective 
in disrupting the Tunisian government’s ability to act in an unencumbered manner.   
B. COUNTERTERRORISM—GOAL: DISRUPT 
Retired 28-year CIA employee Arthur Hulnick stated that the most deadly and 
committed terrorists always act in a secretive manner. Nevertheless, law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies such as the FBI and CIA have acquired useful information on social 
media sites like Facebook that allowed them to disrupt would-be terrorists. One such 
example is the arrest of Antonio Martinez in late 2010. 
Martinez, a Baltimore area resident, posted his desire to commit an act of 
terrorism in the United States. More specifically, he wrote about his plot to blow up a 
military recruiting station.110  Eventually, Martinez’s use of terrorist related language on 
Facebook got the attention of federal authorities, and several FBI agents eventually 
joined Martinez’s online plot. After gaining his confidence, undercover agents supplied 
Martinez with a fake car bomb. A few days later, Martinez tried to detonate the car bomb 
in the parking lot of a military recruiting station, which obviously failed to cause any 
damage, and his terrorist plot was effectively disrupted. A second example involving the 
FBI centers on a Bangladeshi citizen in the United States. 
According to a court document, an undercover FBI agent used the social media 
platform Facebook to communicate with Quazi Mohammad Nafis about his intentions to 
detonate a car bomb near the Federal Reserve building in New York. Quazi, who was in 
the United States on a student visa, had alleged links to the terror group Al-Qaeda.111 
Additional reports from the FBI indicate that Quazi originally came to the United States 
in January of 2012 with the intention to conduct violent jihad. He attempted to recruit 
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individuals for his own terrorist cell inside of the United States. One of Mr. Nafis’s 
potential recruits was actually the FBI agent posing as an Al-Qaeda facilitor. The agent 
later learned that possible targets included a high-ranking official from the U.S. and the 
New York Stock Exchange.112 
After communicating several times with the undercover FBI agent, Quazi asked 
the agent to supply him with 20 50-pound bags of explosives. After receiving the fake 
explosives, Mr. Nafis assembled the explosives for the attack, purchased a detonator, and 
conducted several reconnoiters of the financial district in lower Manhattan.113 On the day 
of the planned attack, Quazi met with the FBI agent and drove a van filled with 1,000 
pounds of inert explosives to the Federal Reserve building and parked it. The two men 
got out of the van and walked to a nearby hotel where Quazi made a video statement. 
After completing his statement, Mr. Nafis tried several times to detonate the explosives. 
Immediately following the failed attempts, the Joint Terrorism Task Force arrested 
Quazi. On February 7, 2013, Quazi Nafis plead guilty to attempting to use a weapon of 
mass destruction and now faces a sentence of up to life in prison. He was set to receive 
sentencing on May 30, 2013. 
C. COUNTERINSURGENCY—GOAL: DISRUPT 
A growing buildup of civil discontent over rising food prices, corruption within 
the government, and unemployment, among other factors,  came to an explosive head on 
the streets of Tunisian in December, 2010 after the aforementioned Mohamed Bouazizi’s 
self-immolation. Bouazizi was an underemployed college graduate, forced to sell fruit 
and vegetables from a cart because there were no other jobs available.114  After police 
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discovered that Mohamed did not have a vendor’s license, they confiscated his cart, 
rendering him completely jobless. In protest, Mr. Bouazizi stood in the middle of the 
street in front of the governor’s office and lit himself on fire. This single act set off a 
renewed wave of protests, particularly through social media platforms such as Facebook 
and Twitter.  
As the voices of discontent grew louder and angrier towards the Ben Ali regime, 
the government began to target the most vocal online activists in an effort to disrupt this 
emerging insurgency. The Tunisian government began to block the social media accounts 
of individuals such as Sofiene Chourabi, at the time a journalist for Al-Tariq al-Jadid 
magazine.115 Sofiene and other online activists began to have their individual Gmail and 
Facebook accounts hacked and taken over. This type of action provides an example of a 
COIN operation with the goal of disrupting a potential movement against the 
government.116 China provides another example of an ongoing COIN effort to disrupt 
Chinese dissidents from even starting to mobilize against the government. 
China has one of the most sophisticated systems of Internet and social media 
censorship in the world. While many assume that China censors criticisms of the 
government, certain policies, or even specific leaders, the 20 to 50 thousand members of 
China’s so-called Internet police are primarily concerned about efforts to act 
collectively.117  Anytime Chinese citizens try to gather together for any reason, to 
criticize the government, support the government, or even celebrate a holiday, Chinese 
officials will try to censor it. In total, an amazing 13 percent of all posts in China are 
censored.118  Looking into the future, some states like Russia are looking to expand their 
offensive social media capabilities in order to increase their effectiveness in disrupting 
any insurgent groups.   
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Recently, the Russian government purchased three new social media targeting 
software packages valued at $1 million each.119  The first system is called Dispute. It is 
“responsible for overall monitoring of the blogosphere and social networks in order to 
single out the centers where the information is created and the ways by which it is spread 
among the virtual society.”120  The second system is called, rather interestingly, System 
Three. It is designed to develop methods of organizing and managing a “virtual 
community of experts.” Despite its officially stated purpose, some believe the Russian 
government, like the Chinese government, is trying to anticipate any efforts to undermine 
the government’s authority. This idea was furthered by the Russian government’s recent 
decision to selectively block content on social media sites that it deems illegal or harmful 
to children. Although the majority of censorship requests made by the Russian 
government to date appear to be legitimate concerns (about Facebook pages that promote 
suicide, for example), opposition political leaders fear the law will begin to be abused and 
lead to more broad social media and Internet censorship.121  
D. UW/INSURGENCY—GOAL: COERCE/DETER 
One of the earliest uses of social media technology in working towards political 
change occurred in the Philippines in 2001. In what became known as the People Power 
II movement, the Filipinos used social media technology to coerce their country’s 
Supreme Court to reinstate damaging evidence in the impeachment trial of then President 
Joseph Estrada. But with less than one percent Internet penetration at that time, it is 
interesting to see how the people use social media to ensure that the documents were seen 
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by the jury and entered into the record. People used mobile phones to send and receive 
SMS messages to and from their existing social networks to coordinate mass protests.122 
Although, in hindsight, this million-person protest was viewed in a somewhat 
negative light by foreign audiences, it still provides a good example of the use of social 
media technology by insurgents to coerce a government to capitulate to the will of the 
people. By simply forwarding simple SMS messages such as “Go 2 EDSA (an acronym 
for a street in Manila). Wear Black,” “Wear black to mourn the death of democracy,” and 
“Military needs to see one million at a rally tomorrow, Jan. 19, to make a decision to go 
against Erap! Please pass on,” the people were able to coordinate the date, time, what to 
wear, and a basic narrative for the protests. After five days of protesting, the chief of the 
military informed President Estrada that the military was withdrawing their support of his 
presidency, and the Supreme Court ruled in favor of removing the President from office 
because the “welfare of the people is the supreme law.’’123 A second example can be 
found in Egypt. 
A rather small group of young Egyptian activists, who eventually took on the 
moniker the April 6 Youth Movement, started to rebel against the Mubarak regime by 
demanding labor reform. The group, which officially started on March 23, 2008, 
protested against rising food prices as well. Instead of taking a traditional route of either 
protesting on the streets, or going to see a local politician, the leadership of the April 6 
Movement launched a Facebook page to show their support of laborers in the city of 
Mahalla. This Facebook page, initiated by group leader Ahmed Maher, started with about 
300 individuals initially joining the page. However, within the first day of its being 
launched, the page had over 3,000 members, and after only a couple of weeks, the social 
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media based network had grown to over 70,000.124  As the number of members grew, so 
too did the goals of the network. The network’s goals now included the call for free 
speech and an end to government nepotism.125 Eventually, Mr. Maher, an engineer, 
realized that to be effective in coercing the government to change its economic and 
regulatory policies, the group had to physically take to the streets.  
Using graphic images taken mostly by members of the Facebook group and 
heartfelt posts on the Facebook page’s community wall, Maher was able to rally 
thousands of workers in the Mahalla area to take to the streets in protest of the Mubarak 
regime. The protests, which occurred on April 6 (the reason for the group’s name), was 
not the first worker protest in the area. In fact, the laborers in Mahalla had been 
periodically striking for over a year. However, these past protests were never formally 
organized or coordinated.126 The April 6 Youth Movement changed this by coordinating 
the mobilization of thousands of protestors on a single day. The protests included general 
labor strikes to disrupt the various industries throughout Mahalla. Additionally, the April 
6 Facebook page was used to direct supporters to hand out informational leaflets and to 
spray paint various areas to allow non-Internet users know what was going on. 
Ultimately, this insurgency was short-lived, but not without consequence. 
Egyptian security forces did not stand idly by and let the protests occur. Rather, police 
actions that day led to at least four protestor deaths and the arrests of over 400 citizens.127  
Despite the group failing to significantly change government policies on that day, the 
protests formed the genesis of a much larger insurgency that would ultimately succeed in 
its objectives. 
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Other examples that fit into this category of citizens using social media (SMS in 
particular) to coerce governments into taking specific actions include South Korean 
students organizing protests against the highly competitive college entrance exams, 
Chinese citizens protesting against the potential of Japan joining the United Nations 
Security Council, and Lebanese citizens rallying in Beirut to force Syrian troops out of 
Lebanon permanently. Although there was a great deal of pressure from the United 
Nations for this same end state, the one million Lebanese protestors helped apply even 
more pressure to the Assad regime, which eventually agreed to withdrawal all 14,000 
Syrian troops from Lebanon.  
E. COUNTERTERRORISM—GOAL: COERCE/DETER 
The U.S. government established the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism 
Communications (CSCC) in September,  2011 to “coordinate, orient, and inform 
Government-wide public communications activities directed at audiences abroad and 
targeted against violent extremists and terrorist organizations, especially Al-Qaida and its 
affiliates and adherents…to reduce radicalization by terrorists and extremist violence and 
terrorism that threaten the interests and the national security of the United States.”128 To 
that end, the CSCC established the Digital Outreach Team (DOT) to aggressively 
monitor and counter terrorist propaganda and recruiting efforts, primarily on social media 
websites on the Internet.  
Publishing content in multiple languages including Arabic, Urdu, Somali, and 
Punjabi, the CSCC has posted over 7,000 separate messages in online forums, established 
53,000 Facebook fans, and produced over 50 videos that have been posted to social 
media sites like Youtube. The videos in Arabic have alone received over two million 
views. This digital content is fully attributed to the U.S. Department of State, and is 
designed with three immediate goals.   
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The CSCC’s first goal is to contest the digital space used by Al-Qaeda. 
Effectively, this means that the CSCC is trying to change the dynamics of the social 
media “circles” that interact within the model described in Chapter II. Formerly, the 
extremist social media space, most notably forum websites like Ana al-Muslim and Ansar 
al Mujahideen, were uncontested.129  The second goal is to redirect the conversation. 
This means the CSCC is trying to challenge the narrative advanced by various terrorist 
groups. To achieve this goal, the CSCC does not try to affirm the positive actions of the 
U.S. government’s foreign policy. Rather, the CSCC highlights the negative about the 
groups they are targeting. This is an offensive versus defensive posture. The third goal is 
to unnerve the adversary. This is simple Psychology 101: get inside the head of one’s 
opponent. An example of the type of work that the CSCC is doing involved a suicide 
bomb attack in Salamiyah, Syria. 
In January 2013, the DOT saw an online post by the Al-Qaeda affiliated group 
Nusrah Front that claimed responsibility for the attack against a rug factory that killed 
dozens of innocent civilians, including children. After the attack was criticized by local 
Syrians, the Nusrah Front claim was retracted.130 The DOT was able to find local footage 
of the attack from credible sources, which included images of some of the children that 
were killed, and post a video on Youtube which highlighted this terrorist group’s actions 
and the after- effects of the bombing. The DOT later found forum postings by Nusrah 
Front members complaining about the anti-Nusrah Front video, and the group created its  
own video that tried to counter the DOT’s work. This vignette provides a good example 
of a government organization deterring a terrorist group from executing future attacks 
that target civilians. The DOT’s efforts also disrupted the group’s operational cycle by 
causing it to spend manpower, resources, and time to produce their counter-product.  
In addition, the CSCC believes it has deterred significant numbers of would-be 
jihadists from joining violent extremist organizations. Although it is not possible to know 
exactly how many (how  can it be proved that someone was deterred from joining based 
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on products posted by the DOT?), based on the counter-messaging and sheer number of 
comments made in reference to DOT’s products, it is not  difficult to think that some 
individuals have been persuaded against joining a terrorist organization. It should be 
noted that this example of deterrence does not fit the classical definition of deterrence in 
that there was no denial or punishment associated with the DOT’s actions. In fact, some 
security experts point to this exact issue as a problem and they think that this strategy is 
inadequate in the fight against terrorism.   
A recent article by John Arquilla states that simply presenting a moderate 
portrayal of Islam in combination with highlighting heinous acts of terrorism on the 
Internet is not sufficient. Dr. Arquilla argues that what is needed is to develop an 
effective way to “back hack” and geo-locate those that post violent jihadi materials as 
well as those that retrieve the information. The argument is that only by tracking down 
and capturing or killing terrorists will groups like Al-Qaeda truly be beaten.131 
F. COUNTERINSURGENCY—GOAL: COERCE/DETER 
The CIA’s Open Source Center has full time staff that include translators, 
researchers, and analysts. As of late 2011, these teams were monitoring over five million  
updates, tweets, and the like, every single day.132  The staff, which pales in comparison 
to some other nations in terms of pure numbers of staffers, includes many who hold 
masters of library science degrees. The Open Source Center searches for obvious subjects 
and key words related to terrorism and political unrest but also tries to understand a given 
country’s narrative. In addition, the CIA tries to determine what is trending or popular at 
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television show is the most talked about subject on social media sites, and not something 
like government corruption or injustice, then it is a sign that the general political situation 
is stable at that time.133 
Although the CIA has increased its ability to develop important intelligence from 
social media, it still has difficulty in determining where an individual who is making the 
posts is located. One of the most difficult obstacles for the CIA to overcome is people’s 
use of shadow Internet IP addresses, which help individuals remain hidden. For example, 
a person could be sending tweets in Arabic under an email address registered in Yemen, 
but could actually be a citizen of the United States living in South America. One way the 
CIA has worked to overcome this obstacle is to try to find those who are sympathetic to 
terrorist organizations and individuals, and then try to monitor their postings for clues on 
identifying and locating the true terrorists.134  
The Open Source Center also has problems associated with countries of interest in 
which there is minimal access to the Internet for average citizens. In these countries, 
individuals must rely on cellular phones and SMS services. In these instances, groups like 
the Taliban and Al-Qaeda can use a closed loop of network subscribers to limit who 
receives their text messages. This forces the CIA to have to devote disproportionate 
resources, including covert eavesdropping resources, to penetrate these networks.135 As 
in the previous example highlighting the CSCC’s efforts, for the CIA’s Open Source 
Center to effectively deter would-be insurgents, the CIA must act on the social media 
gleaned intelligence and strike at those networks through direct action. In examining 
open source research materials, it is not apparent whether or not the CIA has acted on 
social media-based intelligence gathered by the Open Source Center. 
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G. UW/INSURGENCY—GOAL: OVERTHROW/DEFEAT 
During the Egyptian Revolution, which occurred during the Arab Spring, it was 
common to read headlines that described the regime change in Egypt as a Facebook or 
social media-caused revolution. This would imply that the network that ultimately ended 
the regime was rapidly and spontaneously formed. These types of portrayals are 
categorically false and misleading. And, although this section of the chapter focuses on 
Wael Ghonim’s revolutionary network, which did form in a relatively short amount of 
time, it was ultimately a network of networks that came together to overthrow Hosni 
Mubarak’s regime, not some mystical Facebook page or Twitter user.   
When the Arab Spring first broke out in Tunisia, Wael Ghonim was the head of 
marketing at Google for the Middle East and North Africa. Although living outside of 
Egypt, Wael continually monitored what was going on inside of Egypt. One particular 
story that effected Wael in a profound way was the story of Khaled Said. Khaled was the 
recipient of a severe beating by Egyptian police that eventually resulted in Khaled’s 
death. Rather than stand idly by while this police brutality continued, Wael decided to 
protest this specific action.  
Originally, Wael did not have a grand network in mind to bring about political 
changes in Egypt. Rather, he started a Facebook page tilted “Kullena Khaled Said,” or 
“We are all Khaled Said.”  In his first Facebook post on this newly created page, Wael 
wrote, “Today they killed Khaled. If I don’t act for his sake, tomorrow they will kill 
me.”136 Within a few hours, Wael had dozens of people Like his post and add comments. 
Thus, a social-media- based- revolutionary-network was born. Its original purpose was 
two-fold; hold the security force officers who killed Khaled Said responsible for their 
crime and end the continual police brutality that was so common in Egypt. Six months 
later, the network’s purpose had matured. 
By January 2011, Wael’s network had developed a purpose that was multifaceted. 
The objectives included ending the large economic gap that existed between the political 
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elite and the common Egyptian, annulling the emergency law, firing the Minister of 
Interior, and limiting the Presidency to two terms.137 The articulation of these network 
goals corresponded to one of the network’s first major activities, the January 25 day of 
protest in Egypt. From there, the network’s purpose became even more ambitious, though 
simplified. The only purpose after January 25 was overthrowing the regime of President 
Hosni Mubarak.   
The network that finally overthrew the Mubarak government consisted of multiple 
networks formed during different times, out of all the frustration with the ruling party in 
Egypt. The first major component of this overall network was the Muslim Brotherhood, 
formed in 1928 and organized around political change. The second component was the 
Kefaya or “Enough” network. Kefaya was formed in 2004 and consisted of several 
hundred Egyptian intellectuals. Their common purpose was to reform the executive 
branch.138  A third network whose original purpose was political change was the 
aforementioned April 6 Youth Movement. Eventually, individual members of these 
networks formed relationships with each other and with outside entities.   
These outside entities included the Youth Movement of Tunisia, Otpor in Serbia, 
the Academy of Change, and the Youth Movement of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Additionally, the overall revolutionary network grew to include opposition party leader 
Mohamed El Baradei’s Constitution Party. Wael Ghonim’s Facebook-initiated network 
formed relationships with members of several of these other sub-networks. Together, the 
networks developed reciprocal relationships that allowed this network of networks to 
achieve a common purpose in forcing President Mubarak to resign. This overall 
network’s structure is captured in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.  The Egyptian Revolutionary Network of Networks 
Although Figure 5 is a simplification of the Egyptian revolutionary network, it 
does show that no single network or group of people was responsible for achieving the 
overall network’s ultimate purpose. Additionally, the regime change did not occur 
overnight. The situation in Egypt had been deteriorating for decades. As the deterioration 
continued to grow, so too did the number of networks that were formed with political, 
social, and economic reforms in mind.   
Turning attention back to Wael Ghonim’s Facebook network, one of the most 
striking things about the network was that of the hundreds of thousands that eventually 
joined it, the vast majority did not know who Wael Ghonim was, nor did very many of 
the members know each other. Thus, this network was very large in terms of its total 
number of participants, but most of the ties were weak. One compensating factor for the 






of the things that made Wael’s network successful was that it was able to establish both 
bonding social capital (social capital within a network), and bridging social capital (social 
capital that links to outside networks).139 
Another compensating factor that held the participants together was that the 
network’s mission-based purpose affected all of the members in deep and personal ways. 
Decades of despair, misery, and frustration can inspire a network of people to achieve 
goals once thought impossible. This shared purpose helped form the social capital 
between the participants of Wael’s network. Additional factors about the way Wael ran 
his network help explain its ultimate success. 
Wael set up the “We Are all Khaled Said” Facebook page to be administered 
anonymously. Wael did this for two reasons. First, he wanted the revolutionary 
movement to be about the Egyptian people themselves. He wanted to avoid centering the 
network’s purpose on advancing any one leader’s agenda. Second, the network’s 
purposes, throughout the life of the network, were nefarious in the eyes of the Mubarak 
regime. Wael was afraid of being arrested, beaten, and possibly killed. However, Wael’s 
network did experience most of the network governance stages of emerge, connect, 
identify, collaborate, organize, codify, and evolve.140 
First, the network emerged via a Facebook page. The majority of the network’s 
connections were made by discovery by other, like-minded Egyptians. What is somewhat 
unique about this particular network was that it was not based on an existing, offline 
social network. The network identified itself by having a Facebook page name, and also 
taking on the identity of the January 25 protestors. The network gained further legitimacy 
by using common logos such as the Egyptian flag and the picture of Khaled Said’s 
battered face. As the network grew, so did the collaboration of the members within the 
network itself as well as with other networks. The network organized itself primarily 
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using social media technology. But the network was also organized around functional 
areas such as writing, reporting, capturing video, taking pictures, and recruiting.   
Although most people do not think of codified rules when looking at images of 
tens of thousands of protestors, Wael’s network codified the rules when it implored its 
participants to follow in executing the network’s most important activity of protesting in 
the streets of Egypt. Some of these rules included: protesting peacefully and without 
breaking any laws, being at the pre-determined protest locations on time, not carrying any 
unnecessary items such as licenses or credit cards, carrying only the Egyptian flag (shows 
solidarity), using the pre-written chants, not disturbing traffic, and not going to the 
protests alone. Finally, as was described in the exploration of the network’s purpose, the 
network evolved from several hundred members calling for justice for Khaled Said, to 
several hundred thousand calling for the end of Hosni Mubarak’s rule. A further 
interesting aspect of how Wael’s network was governed was how he made important 
decisions. 
Wael Ghonim was clearly a leading figure in the overall network of networks that 
caused President Mubarak to resign. He was also the leader of his Facebook-based 
revolutionary network. Despite his status in the network, Wael relied on participatory 
democracy for many of the decisions made on behalf of the network, especially those that 
involved activities on the ground.141 Using web-based technology, Wael would poll his 
network participants before making major decisions in order to ensure the network was 
comfortable with the decisions being made.142  This focused Wael on the most important 
issues of his network, a rather ingenious way to democratize network members’ 
feedback. Finally, he demonstrated good network leadership skills by deferring decision 
making to others (such as April 6 Youth Movement leader Ahmed Maher) in areas with 
which he was not familiar. Wael also showed he was a good leader in the way that the 
network’s tasks, activities, operations, and processes were managed. 
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First, and most obviously, the network relied on Facebook to store and distribute 
information to members. Social media platforms provide an extremely low cost, efficient, 
and effective way to communicate with a network. Next, Wael and the other network 
leaders used Google tools to help manage their information. The network developed a 
massive email list that was managed in a Gmail account. This provided redundancy 
should the Egyptian government block Facebook, which it eventually did. The network 
also used Google Moderator. This is a tool that gives a person the ability to ask questions 
of a limitless number of users, and then rank those questions based on popularity.143 This 
innovative technology provided an easy way to democratize network members’ feedback. 
Google Docs was also utilized in controlling and managing information. 
The network’s first major activity was a large-scale protest on January 25. In 
order to disseminate important details, rules, and coordinating instructions to his network, 
Wael compiled all pertinent information into a single document and uploaded it to the 
Internet using Google Docs. Wael then gave over 50,000 network members access to the 
document, and asked members to help get the document to the masses by posting it, or 
links to it, to various online forums, politically based websites, other Facebook pages, 
and through Twitter.144  Reaching out to this many people for assistance, also known as 
crowdsourcing, was another common part of the processes that Wael’s network used in 
executing its tasks and operations. 
Other examples of crowdsourcing tasks and operations included asking members 
to contact any known journalists to help spread the network’s messages and asking 
network participants to send mass text messages (SMSs) to reach non-Facebook-using 
Egyptians. Additionally, Wael and other revolutionary leaders realized that the majority 
of Egyptians were not using the Internet. Therefore, another crowd-sourced critical task 
was to distribute printed fliers to both poor, urban areas and rural areas of Egypt. Also, 
network members were asked to contact at least five other people by phone or in person 
and encourage those people to join the protests on January 25.   
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Ultimately, after only 18 days of mass protests, the regime of Hosni Mubarak 
stepped down. The President officially resigned on February 11, 2011. The military 
leadership stepped in to fill the power void, and the people had achieved their goal, at 
least in the short term. Though it remains to be seen whether this revolution truly brings 
about the desired changes of the Egyptian people, it is clear that social media technology 
played a large role in helping organize and direct the protests of many Egyptians. 
H. COUNTERTERRORISM—GOAL: OVERTHROW/DEFEAT 
In late 2009, Operational Detachment—Alpha (ODA) 5122 began tracking a 
Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia (JRTN) affiliated terrorist group that was operating 
south of Mosul, Iraq. The 12-plus-man group was actively facilitating the movement of 
foreign fighters, money, weapons, and equipment. Intelligence reports indicated there 
were several individuals competing to be the leader and that distrust was beginning to 
seep into the group. Although the details and specific TTPs cannot be discussed in an 
unclassified thesis, the ODA used behavior modification messaging, delivered through 
social media technology, to capitalize on this internal competition and distrust.145  The 
messages were of two basic types.  
The first message type was a series of insults aimed at the individuals competing 
to be leader of the group. The second message type was a series of accusations against 
various group members. These messages accused certain individuals of working with the 
United States. To reinforce these messages, the ODA conducted a kinetic strike shortly 
after the accusatory, pro-U.S. messages went out. The combination of kinetic and non-
kinetic, social media-based targeting caused the group to self-implode. This particular 
terrorist group, while relatively small, was effectively defeated largely through social 
media-delivered messaging. This vignette also demonstrates the multiplicative effects of 
non-lethal cyber targeting on the overall targeting of terrorist groups. 
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I. COUNTERINSURGENCY—GOAL: OVERTHROW/DEFEAT 
Unfortunately for people living under repressive regimes, social media is used for 
more than capturing criminals and terrorists. In Iran, for example, authorities use social 
media to repress their own citizens. The most well-known instance of this repression 
occurred in 2009 following Iran’s presidential election. Protestors, upset by obvious 
election fraud, began calling for nationwide protests throughout the country. Alarmed and 
concerned, the Iranian government took steps to defeat the dissent. 
The Iranian regime used several social media websites to gather photos of various 
protestors and circulated the photos in order to identify individuals in the photos. Iranian 
authorities also used sites, especially Facebook, to find out personal information and the 
whereabouts of protestors. Also, the regime sent messages to Iranian citizens living 
abroad, warning them not to support the so-called Green Movement unless they wanted 
to hurt their own relatives and friends in Iran. Further still, the Iranian government used 
social media sites to distribute pro-regime propagandistic videos and sent mass text 
messages to Iranian citizens warning them to stay away from protests in the streets.146  
Thus, Iran’s government was effective at undermining the Green Movement. 
More recently, the Iranian government has increased its blocking and censorship 
of certain websites, including many popular social media sites. In addition, Iran’s cyber 
police have been cracking down on citizen’s use of virtual private networks (VPNs). As 
Chapter II described, VPNs use secure protocol to encrypt users’ data and identities and 
allows individuals to circumvent blocks on the Internet put in place by the 
government.147 In addition to efforts inside its own borders, the Iranian government is 
also using social media to help its ally, the Assad regime in Syria.  
Besides traditional military weapons and equipment, Tehran is providing Assad’s 
security forces with technology designed to prevent Syrian protestors from being able to 
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communicate through social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter.148  Iranian 
officials also share techniques, hardware, and software to conduct Internet surveillance. 
This assistance is being combined with electronic surveillance systems, as well as drone 
aircraft. Together, these tools provide a significant advantage to the Assad regime in the 
on-going battle in Syria.149 In a recent example of how Syria is trying to defeat the 
opposition, the official Reuter’s Twitter account was hacked. The hackers, allegedly part 
of the Syrian Electronic Army, then sent out a series of false tweets that were designed to 
undermine and discredit the Free Syrian Army and reduce the amount of support the 
group was receiving from the local populace.150  This example completes the three-by-
three matrix template for this chapter. The remainder of the chapter provides some 
additional examples of how social media can support other ARSOF core activities. 
J. SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE  
Although some people in the United States, especially those living outside of 
major cities, may view spray-painted graffiti as a relatively harmless crime, Los Angeles 
County crews removed nearly 40 million square feet of graffiti in 2007. This massive 
clean-up effort cost taxpayers almost $30 million.151 One tagger, or person using spray 
paint to illegally deface property, especially problematic in the greater Los Angeles area, 
was known by the moniker “Buket.”  Buket was believed to have been personally 
responsible for at least $150,000 in damages.   
Having failed for months to determine the real identity of Buket using traditional 
means, Los Angeles county deputies began combing the Internet for clues as to who 
Buket was in order to finally arrest him or her. Officials state their big breakthrough came 
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in the form of a YouTube video showing Buket spray painting 20 feet above the busy 
Hollywood Freeway during broad daylight. The video was set to music and posted to 
YouTube and other tagger-related blogs.152 This video, and others like it, allowed 
authorities to learn that Buket’s work was featured in a book titled Los Angeles Graffiti. 
After contacting the book’s author, law enforcement officials were able to determine that 
Buket’s real name was Cyrus Yazdani, a 24 year-old convention planner from Las Vegas. 
Yazdani was subsequently arrested. The U.S. attorney’s office and the Secret Service are 
also using social media to pursue criminals. 
 Another example of how these two U.S. government agencies using social media 
involved a man named Maxi Sopo. Mr. Sopo was accused of bank fraud in Seattle, 
Washington. When Sopo learned that federal agents from the attorney general’s office 
were looking into his activities, he fled to Mexico. After safely arriving in Mexico, Sopo 
started to update his Facebook status, saying things like “living in paradise” and “loving 
it.”153 He continued to add posts indicating how great his life had become and how much 
fun he was having with his friends. In one post, Sopo posted a picture that showed him in 
front of a BMW and a Courvoisier liquor backdrop.   
A Secret Service agent was able to use the backdrop to narrow down Sopo’s 
location to Cancun, Mexico. Digging further on Facebook, this same Secret Service agent 
was able to view. Sopo’s friends’ list because of the Facebook settings Sopo had chosen. 
In scrubbing this list of friends, it was determined that Sopo was Facebook friends with a 
person associated with the U.S. Justice Department. A call went out to this former Justice 
Department official who cooperated with authorities and was able to contact Sopo to  get 
his exact location. Shortly thereafter, Sopo was arrested by Mexican authorities and sent 
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back to the United States. Ultimately, Sopo received 33 months in prison, five years of 
supervised release, and $147,249 in restitution for four counts of bank fraud.154 
K. COUNTER-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION  
A final example of the CIA’s use of social media is rather fascinating: finding 
nuclear weapons. Rose Gottemoeller, the acting U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms 
Control, is behind a campaign to explore ways in which social media (as tools of 
communication) can help rid the world of nuclear weapons. In particular, Gottemoeller is 
interested in crowd sourcing problems such as locating nuclear warheads, determining the 
location of nuclear facilities, knowing the status of deployed weapons, and helping to  
learn if nations are upholding their nuclear arms agreements.155 Gottemoeller said the 
basic concept is to empower ordinary citizens through various civilian monitoring 
projects, whereby the insight provided by citizens is combined with the usual methods of 
verifying a given country’s nuclear intentions.156  
The Institute for Science and International Security has been uploading satellite 
photos of Iranian nuclear sites for several years.157  By examining photos of the same 
facility over a period of months or years, individuals can assist in monitoring the 
development of these potentially dangerous locations.  The key to making this 
arrangement successful is the marrying up of verification technologies and the 
networking capabilities provided by Facebook, Twitter, and related Internet sites. 
Another important aspect that Gottemoeller points out is that the emergence of citizen-led 
efforts should result in an increased level of trust between the state and the citizens of that  
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state. Additionally, the decreasing cost of technology will continue to allow non-
governmental agencies to acquire advanced technologies ranging from satellites to hand-
held devices.   
There are several iPhone applications, for example, that can turn an everyday 
iPhone into a fairly accurate radiation meter. Increasing one’s investment from 99 cents 
to around $50, people can buy a surprisingly accurate Geiger counter attachment that 
connects directly to an iPhone or iPad. The potential of combining open source satellite 
verification and transparency qualities, Facebook and Twitter communication and 
dissemination qualities, and the ability to use an everyday, hand-held Geiger counter 
device in an effort to locate and track nuclear materials is important. Of course, the 
opposite view of this combination could be viewed by some as espionage or treason. 
Thus, the CIA must be cautious about how it advances this empowerment of citizens.   
L. INFORMATION OPERATIONS  
There are numerous ways in which social media can be used to conduct 
information operations. At the strategic level it is being used by U.S. European Command 
(EUCOM) to influence multi-lingual citizens across EUCOM’s area of operations. The 
primary platforms are a regional Web initiative call Southeast European Times or 
SETimes and a companion Facebook page.158  These websites provide a variety of tools 
such as forums, and polls that encourage online community interaction. Over time and 
through repeated exposure to EUCOM messaging, a surprising 93 percent of SETime’s 
Facebook fans who responded to a poll acknowledged they had been affected by 
information provided on SETimes.com and the companion Facebook page.159 Another 
example involves the Russian government’s use of social media. 
The Russian government recently purchased a software package called Storm 12. 
Storm 12 is designed to automatically spread government generated messages throughout 
the social media environment, in addition to pre-prepared influence messages aimed at 
                                                 
158 Jamie Efaw and Christopher Heidger, “Another Tool in the Influencer’s Toolbox: A Case Study,” 
https://globalecco.org/97#All (accessed May 20, 2013). 
159 Ibid. 
 78 
the mass social media network audience. Clearly, governments around the globe realize 
the potential power inherent in social media and are investing in the technology to stay 
ahead of the competition within the social media environment. 
M. OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE (OSINT) 
The U.S. consulate in Benghazi was attacked by terrorists on September 11, 2012. 
The result of the attack included the deaths of four Americans. Despite a delay in 
mainstream news coverage, information about the attack, including videos and pictures, 
appeared on social media almost immediately.160 On September 12, President Obama 
announced the death of U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens at 0721 EST. Five hours before 
the announcement gruesome pictures of the Ambassador’s body had already been posted 
on Facebook. Additionally, anti-American Twitter accounts reported that Salafi Islamists 
were responsible for the attacks. Subsequent investigations into the attacks revealed that 
several DoD operations centers in the region were relying on mainstream reporting 
sources for information on the attack and had not scanned social media platforms for 
additional details.161   
Although information taken from social media cannot replace traditional 
intelligence sources, it can help establish what is happening on the ground, especially in 
times of crisis. Thus, social media should augment, but not replace, OSINT and other 
forms of intelligence. Ignoring the information that social media provides during periods 
of conflict is no longer acceptable. There are many other ways to make use of the open 
source information available on social media platforms. 
Language sentiment analysis (LSA) software can be used to analyze written 
content that is posted to the Internet to determine who authored the material. Social 
media data can also be used as an early warning system since the frequent appearance of 
certain key words can be used as predictors of future violent events such as riots and 
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protests.162  In the Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) lab at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, analysts are able to combine open source social media data with 
advanced analytical methodologies to provide commanders greater fidelity about their 
operating environment. Using social network analysis software, temporal records, 
geospatial data, and relational analysis, CORE lab researchers can create new ways of 
visualizing the battlefield which allows policy-makers and military leaders to make more 
informed decisions.163 
N. PREDICTIVE CAPABILITY 
A final look at the U.S. government’s use of social media revolves around the 
efforts of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Although the FBI readily 
acknowledges the value of the information provided by open source social media sources, 
the organization is looking to develop the ability to identify and geo-locate breaking 
events and emerging threats.164 In a posting on the Federal Business Opportunities 
website, the FBI wants to develop the following application: 
The information gathered from news and social media outlets would be 
overlaid onto a digital map, pinpointing the location of the “breaking 
events,” along with all other relevant contextual data. Additional 
information, including U.S. domestic terror data, worldwide terror data, 
the location of all U.S. embassies, consulates and military installations, 
weather conditions and forecasts, and traffic video feeds, would also be 
overlaid on the map. A robust search feature would also be incorporated 
into the app, which would allow the ability to instantly search and monitor 
key words and strings in ‘publicly available’ tweets across the Twitter Site 
and any other ‘publicly available social networking sites/forums,’ 
according to the RFI. The FBI wants the search function to allow for 
simultaneous key word searches that can look at 10 or 20 separate 
incidents/threats at the same time within the same ‘window.’ The ability to  
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monitor tweets and other social media data in a minimum of 12 foreign 
languages, and to immediately translate those posts into English, is also 
outlined as a required feature of the application.165 
As opposed to simply understanding the current situation on the ground, the FBI 
wants to use social media to actually predict the future. According to the FBI, social 
media provides unique access to communications about non-ordinary events in advance 
of their occurrence. An example of how this can work is provided by a Rand Corporation 
study which used Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC)166 software to analyze the 
Twitter hashtag #IranElection during the 2009 elections. The Rand study found that an 
increase in swear words in tweets was an accurate predictor of where and when protests 
would occur. This is similar to the research referenced earlier in this discussion of using 
LSA software to predict riots and protests.  
O. CROWDSOURCING:167 THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN 
CONFLICT  
Crowdsourcing is not a new concept. Examples abound in everyday life including 
putting pictures of missing children on milk cartoons, posting a wanted fugitive’s mug-
shots on television news programs, and providing general crime phone tip lines for 
citizens to report suspicious activity. However, when crowdsourcing techniques are 
combined with social media platforms, new possibilities emerge. These possibilities 
represent the next wave of social media technology applications for use in conflict.168  
With crowdsourcing one can “accomplish previously unattainable objectives and 
accomplish existing objectives in a more efficient and inexpensive way.”169 Generally 
speaking, there are three primary objectives for using crowdsourcing for security 
purposes. These objectives include collecting intelligence, solving problems, and 
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influencing populations.170 Collecting intelligence from crowdsourcing is a form of 
human intelligence collection (HUMINT). This type of HUMINT can be either direct or 
indirect. Direct intelligence requires asking someone for specific information (who pulled 
the trigger?). Indirect intelligence refers to the information received that still has to be 
sifted through and analyzed.171 Crowdsourcing to solve problems simply refers to asking 
for the “wisdom of the crowd” to help solve challenging problems or complete difficult 
tasks. The third use of crowdsourcing with social media involves influencing target 
populations. 
The key distinction between a crowdsourcing platform that utilizes social media 
technology and traditional influence platforms is that crowdsourcing involves continuous 
two-way dialogue and interaction. Rather than bombard people with radio advertisements 
or fliers handed out at markets, crowdsourcing correctly involves slowly persuading 
others to make changes to their behavior by facilitating their own belief that it is they, the 
participants, who are the ones promoting the change that you, the administrator want.172  
Crowdsourcing platforms allow one to discreetly persuade a given populous and, 
if executed correctly, change a targeted group’s behaviors and points of view. Goals for 
influence operations using crowdsourcing include countering extremist propaganda, 
providing intelligence, coming together to oppose a regime, and adopting a position more 
favorable to U.S. forces. Crowdsourcing can achieve these goals because by harnessing 
social media. Crowdsourcing platforms can provide a variety of media including pictures, 
videos, and text, and can send these repetitively to a target audience.173 This is different 
from putting out information on a regular social media platform.  Whereas social media 
sites such as Facebook and Twitter may help persuade dissidents to overthrow an 
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oppressive, dictatorial leader, combining crowdsourcing with social media allows one to 
ask those same dissidents the best way the U.S. government can help them overthrow 
their dictator.174  Despite the potential that crowdsourcing represents, this technology 
should not be used when confidentiality and secrecy is very important or when a 
command’s risk tolerance is low.  
P. CONCLUSION 
As shown, there are a variety of ways in which governments and those that 
oppose them use social media to achieve certain security objectives. In the United States, 
law enforcement agencies are using social media to catch criminals and terrorists who 
have already committed illegal acts, to spot potentially dangerous developments, and to 
try to stop criminals and terrorists before they act. In more oppressive states, social media 
is being used to monitor, identify, track, and locate those who oppose the powers in 
charge. Social media is also used to warn citizens to avoid government protests, as well 
as to spread pro-government propaganda. Despite this growing trend, discussions of 
social media and its integration into military operations is largely absent or non-systemic. 
Clearly, though, social media technology and the added value it brings in fusing the 
effects of kinetic and non-kinetic operations is too important to ignore in future special 
operations doctrinal publications.  
Looking forward, social media will continue to be more intertwined and 
integrated into our everyday lives. The decreasing costs of hardware and software 
provide citizens access to technology once limited to nation states. The ability for 
governments to maintain and secure “secrets” is decreasing. Marrying assets that provide 
transparency and the ability to verify, such as civilian satellites, with social media assets, 
which allow for rapid communication and collaboration, will further blur the lines 
between ordinary citizens and their governments. This creates a delicate trust relationship 
between the government and the people. In addition, these developments should serve as  
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a warning to good natured citizens around the world. The Taliban, for example, has been 
reported to be using Facebook to gather intelligence on Australian soldiers heading to 
Afghanistan. 
Basically, Taliban insurgents use attractive photos of women to befriend soldiers 
on sites like Facebook. Using the geo-tagging function built into many websites then 
allows the Taliban to determine the exact location where a post is made or photo is 
uploaded. Not only can soldiers unintentionally compromise on-going operations in 
country, but family and friends of soldiers can inadvertently jeopardize the military 
operations as well as themselves by providing sensitive information online.175  Clearly, 
then, individuals must understand that everything that they post online could potentially 
be used by government entities and others for a multitude of purposes, some of which 
may not be in their best interests. Like it or not, social media is here to stay. Governments 
and citizens alike must be aware of its potential and be deliberate in their planned use of 
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IV. ASSESSING THE USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN A 
REVOLUTIONARY ENVIRONMENT 
As social media technological capabilities progress and the number of world-wide 
users of social media platforms continues to increase at a rapid rate (one in four people on 
earth will be using social media by 2014), it is inevitable that this communication 
medium will play some role in determining the outcome of all significant conflicts in the 
future.176  
 
Figure 6.  Percentage of the World’s Population Using Social Media 
Also, social media integration appears almost seamless to many people around the globe 
in nearly every facet of life from politics to entertainment, sports, the economy, 
education, and health care. For example, in some countries in East Africa, young people 
tend to think that Facebook is the Internet.177  Therefore, it is of the upmost importance 
to understand how social media will impact the United States military’s ability to shape 
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and influence the outcome of future military engagements. To that end, the first part of 
this final chapter will outline a number of key factors that should be taken into account by 
military planners in assessing the most appropriate use of social media technology in 
conflict. More specifically, this chapter primarily focuses on assessing the best use of 
social media technologies in support of an UW campaign. The second part of the chapter 
identifies the various overarching ways in which social media can be used in conflict. 
This menu of options is ranked based on the relevant amount of risk a person would face 
in using social media in a particular way. Finally, this chapter will address and identify 
the limitations and potential misuses of social media technology in revolutionary warfare, 
that is, both the conditions in which social media should not be used and the objectives 
that social media should not attempt to accomplish. This chapter is significant because 
the author suggests that the U.S. DoD must develop a methodology for assessing how to 
incorporate social media technology into war time plans.   
Developing an assessment methodology is important because as the events of the 
Arab Spring unfolded it became apparent that the stories, videos, and still images that 
spread through the use of social media created the necessary spark of activism and 
outrage that fueled many people’s revolutionary feelings.178 This was evident in Tunisia 
where videos posted online to websites, like YouTube, of government forces committing 
violent acts against protestors motivated others to join the insurgent movement.179 Social 
media can also accelerate and increase a key ingredient in building and sustaining 
revolutionary movements - the sense of inevitable victory.180  This is achieved in part by 
rapidly and effectively spreading the narratives of the insurgent movement, which can 
ultimately help persuade otherwise neutral bystanders into supporting a resistance 
effort.181  Finally, social media technology can rapidly accelerate the pace in which 
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social organizations are formed, and expand the possibilities for recruiting, 
communicating, and mobilizing those individuals that make up an insurgent group.182  
With the importance that social media will play in future UW and insurgent 
operations established, the thesis will examine how to assess the appropriate use of social 
media technology in a given country/situation to help U.S. armed forces achieve their 
desired end-states. By going through the following list of considerations, a military 
strategist will be in a better position to determine which of the uses of social media would 
best support U.S. objectives in a revolutionary environment.  
A. INTERNET USAGE 
This is the first and most basic consideration a strategist should consider when 
analyzing the social media environment in a given country. The total number and 
percentage of the population with access to the Internet helps to make the first big “cut” 
when designing the integration of social media into military plans. Basically, it would not 
make a lot of sense to attempt to engage a target population through Internet-based social 
media platforms if the vast majority of citizens were not online. However, just because a 
given citizenry does not have access to the Internet does not mean that using social media 
to support military operations should be ruled out.   
Mobile phone-based social media applications, for example, might still be a 
viable option. Additionally, Internet-based social media platforms may still be 
appropriate despite a relatively low number of Internet users in a given country should 
the operation have a limited desired end-state. In other words if the goal is to overthrow a 
dictatorial regime and less than five percent of the total population is online, a Facebook-
like social media platform may not be appropriate in mobilizing a large percentage of the 
citizens to protest in the streets of the target country. As a point of reference, Tunisia’s 
Internet penetration is 39.1 percent, Egypt’s is 35.6 percent, Libya’s is 17.0 percent, and 
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Yemen’s is 14.9 percent.183  Although social media were used to some degree in each of 
these four countries that experienced regime change during the Arab Spring, the citizens 
in Tunisia and Egypt relied on social media to a greater extent in mobilizing their 
populations. However, if the goal is more limited in nature, such as building a core cadre 
of defectors, then even in a country with minimal Internet access, using Internet-based 
social media platforms may be appropriate. An example will make this point clear. 
Despite Cuba’s recently (January 2013) activating an undersea fiber optic ALBA-
1 cable, the majority of Cuban residents do not have full access to the Internet. Estimates 
range from 2.9 percent to 10 percent.184  However, even before this fiber optic cable was 
activated, certain categories of Cuban citizens were (and still are) allowed to have 
Internet access in their homes. Groups that are authorized to have Internet access at home 
include doctors, senior managers, and select academics.185 Therefore, if the U.S. military 
wanted to build a core group of underground leaders that included individuals from these 
groups, then Internet-based social media might be an appropriate means of reaching and 
interacting with them. Table 4 provides data on potential countries of interest. 
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Country # of Internet Users % Internet Penetration 
Iran 42,000,000 53.3% 
Russia 67,982,547 47.7% 
Venezuela 12,097,156 41.1% 
China 538,000,000 40.1% 
Syria 5,069,418 22.5% 
Djibouti 61,320 7.9% 
Afghanistan 1,520,996 5.0% 
Somalia 126,070 1.2% 
North Korea Not Significant Not Significant 
Tunisia 4,196,564 39.1% 
Egypt 29,809,724 35.6% 
Libya 954,275 17.0% 
Yemen 3,691,000 14.9% 
Table 4.   Internet Access and Penetration in Select Countries as of June 30, 2012186 
B. SOCIAL MEDIA USAGE 
After determining the total number of Internet users and the percentage of the 
population this represents, it is important to understand how many of those with access to 
the Internet actually use social media technology. Additionally, it is important to 
determine which social media sites people in a targeted country actually use. Regimes 
concerned about the mobilizing potential that can be achieved through the use of social 
media technology are increasingly blocking major, non-state controlled social media 
websites like Facebook and Twitter in favor of social media sites that are controlled from 
within the country. Examples of state-authorized social media platforms in repressive 
countries include Qzone, Tencent Weibo, Sina Weibo, and Wechat in China.   
Some of the countries that block major U.S.-based social media platforms 
including Facebook include China, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Myanmar, Cuba, and 
Zimbabwe. In these instances, a planner may have to use alternate social media platforms 
or mobile phone-based platforms, or start a new social media website using ning.com or 
another turn-key type Internet service company. The difficulty with this latter option is to 
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drive enough people from a targeted demographic to make a newly created social media 
site viable. This option also depends on the nature of the goal for the use of social media 
technology. If the goal involves executing information operations on a large scale, 
developing a newly created social media website may not be the right course of action. 
Country # of Facebook Users % Facebook Penetration 
Iran Not Significant Not Significant 
Russia 7,963,400 5.6% 
Venezuela 9,766,540 33.1% 
China 633,300 0.0% 
Syria Not Significant Not Significant 
Djibouti 50,140 6.5% 
Afghanistan 384,220 1.3% 
Somalia 123,480 1.2% 
North Korea Not Significant Not Significant 
Tunisia 3,328,300 31.0% 
Egypt 12,173,540 14.5% 
Libya 781,700 13.9% 
Yemen 495,440 2.0% 
Table 5.   Total Number of Facebook Users as of December 31, 2012187 
In terms of planning to use social media technology to support UW, the key take-
away from this section is two-fold. First, before going into a given country, how 
indigenous personnel use social media must be understood. Second, what specific 
websites or technologies local people use must be known so that these platforms may be 
monitored and utilized. 
C. MOBILE PHONE USAGE 
After examining the targeted countries Internet and social media usage aggregate 
numbers, the next step in assessing the social media environment is to look at the country 
in question’s mobile phone usage and penetration rate. A quick examination of Table 6 
shows that the number of cell phones in service in each country and the penetration rate is 
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much higher than the number of Internet and social media users. A closer examination 
reveals certain situations in which Internet-based social media platforms may not be 
appropriate in a given country, but where the mobile phone-based social media may be 
appropriate. For example, Afghanistan’s Internet penetration rate is only 5.0 percent, but 
the country’s mobile phone penetration rate is 57.7 percent. 
Another important consideration, especially in relatively poor countries where 
mobile phone social media platforms may be the only viable option, is to factor in the 
cost of SMS to one’s target audience. If the cost of sending and receiving SMS messages 
is exceedingly costly, individuals are less likely to engage through this medium.188 
However, there are ways of off-setting the cost of SMS to potential movement 
participants such as automatically reloading their SIM card with additional credits. One 
other important characteristic of global mobile phone usage is that in several countries 
there are more mobile phones in service compared to the total population. This is not 
unusual even in poorer countries in Africa where it is normal for people in the upper-
income levels to have two mobile phones on different networks and sometimes even 
three or more phones.189 
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Country # of Mobiles Registered % Mobile Penetration 
Iran 56,043,000 71.1% 
Russia 236,700,000 166.1% 
Venezuela 28,782,000 97.6% 
China 986,253,000 73.4% 
Syria 13,117,000 58.2% 
Djibouti 193,000 24.9% 
Afghanistan 17,558,000 57.7% 
Somalia 655,000 6.5% 
North Korea 1,000,000 4.1% 
Tunisia 12,388,000 115.4% 
Egypt 83,425,000 99.7% 
Libya 10,000,000 178.1% 
Yemen 11,668,000 47.1% 
Table 6.   2011 Total Number and Penetration Rate of Mobile Phones190  
D. THE SOCIAL MEDIA ENVIRONMENT 
This consideration focuses on trying to gain an understanding of the overall social 
media environment. This can be partially accomplished by using the conceptual model 
introduced in chapter 2. This graphical representation provides a means of organizing and 
framing the overall media environment and can help determine how much freedom of 
maneuver on social media platforms a person has within the specific country of interest. 
The next three considerations (government Internet and SMS censorship, government 
Internet surveillance, and security force effectiveness and enforcement capability) will 
provide the details needed to develop a more robust understanding of the social media 
environment one will be potentially operating in. An example will provide clarification as 
to how to examine this aspect of the assessment methodology. 
In a recent field survey, Iranian citizens were asked what their three most 
important news sources were. Of those Iranians surveyed, the vast majority stated that 
television (96 percent), the press (55 percent), and strong personal ties (51 percent, 
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including family and close friends) were the top three sources for general information.191  
The complete list is shown in Table 7. It is interesting to see that information obtained 
from the Internet and through SMS ranked higher than information received from 
mosques. Also, the information received while in a taxi cab was almost as valued as 
information communicated in mosques. Finally, only one percent of people indicated 
they used government offices as a source of information, though the state run IRIB 
television channel was listed most frequently (86 percent) as the most watched channel in 
Iran. State controlled radio station Radio Payam (31 percent) was the most popular 
among those who selected radio as a primary means of receiving information, while 
Radio Farda (4 percent) was the most popular international radio program. 
Communication Medium  % Using As Source of Information 
Television 96% 
Press 55% 
Strong Social Ties 51% 
Radio 32% 
Weak Social Ties 28% 
Internet 26% 




Shops / Café 2% 
Government Offices 1% 
Table 7.   Ranked Communications Mediums that Are Used to Gather  
Information in Iran 
In discussing SMS texting, most survey respondents indicated that SMS was a 
popular advertising medium and was used frequently to exchange jokes.192  However, it 
is not used as extensively for new and informational purposes and was subject to some 
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regime blocking when politically and socially sensitive topics were discussed.193 Despite 
being a signatory of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, an 
international agreement that stresses that every person should have the freedom of 
expression, most Iranian citizens feel anything but free to express themselves.194 In fact a 
common trait that can be seen in the lowest news sources (mosques, taxis, shops/cafes, 
and government offices) is that they are all public places. This may mean that individuals 
are especially guarded when outside of their own homes. Also, the strong scores given to 
both strong and weak social ties indicate that a certain level of trust exists among offline 
social networks in Iran. 
In terms of Internet use, the younger demographic members favored the Internet 
compared to older demographic members, and the majority (66.5 percent) used the 
Internet at home compared to only 14 percent at work and nine percent in Internet cafes. 
Specifically looking at social media platforms, 42 percent of Internet users reported 
reading blogs, 20 percent reported using Internet-based social media websites, 18 percent 
stated they commented on other peoples blogs, and eight percent reported writing their 
own blogs.195  Only two percent of Internet users reported using Twitter, and of those, 
most stated they only used Twitter a few times a month. The survey also asked Iranian 
citizens what topics they discussed most often on social media. The results are 
summarized in Table 8. 
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Topic Discussed % of Respondents  
Personal Issues 37% 
Social Issues 32% 
Cultural Issues 30% 
News 29% 
Table 8.   Most Frequently Discussed Topics on Social Media in Iran196 
A second, online only survey was conducted using the file sharing website 
4shared.com. The survey was written in the Persian language. Surprisingly 4shared.com 
is not filtered in Iran.197 The survey was designed to examine the potential of using social 
media for sociopolitical exchange and mobilization. The results of this second survey, 
completed by 2,802 respondents, showed more promise in terms of the potential of social 
media’s utilization in Iran. 
Before discussing the results of this survey, it is helpful to describe the 
demographics of those completing the survey:  80 percent of respondents were under 30 
years old, 92 percent were male, 78 percent had a university degree, and 20 percent stated 
they held a masters or PhD.198 To start examining the results of the follow-on survey, the 
information sources that these Internet experienced Iranians stated were most important 
to them is covered. Table 9 summarizes the results. 
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Communication Medium  % Using As Source of Information 
Internet 85% 
Television 67% 
Strong Social Ties 39% 
Press 29% 
Work / School 22% 
Radio 11% 
Government Offices 9% 




Shops / Café 0% 
Table 9.   Iranian Internet Users Most Important Sources of Information199 
It is interesting to note how the Internet went from only 26 percent to 85 percent 
in terms of how many people view it as an important source of information. Admittedly, 
these results are from a different survey using a different collection methodology. Still, 
the significant difference is telling. It is also noteworthy to see that Internet savvy 
individuals did not place a higher value on information gleamed from SMS. It is also 
interesting to examine where this target demographic accesses the Internet. 
The survey respondents indicated that accessing the Internet was mostly done at 
home (84 percent), followed by work (36.5 percent), school (33 percent), their mobile 
phone (30 percent), and Internet cafes (25 percent). In terms of specific online activities, 
reading blogs (92 percent) and commenting on blogs (70 percent) were more popular 
compared to simply belonging to an online social network (68 percent). Twitter use 
amongst this specific group was much higher compared to the population at large with 17 
percent reporting they use Twitter and follow other’s tweets. The mobile phone use 
findings are a bit more promising for those interested in the potential of social media 
utilization in Iran.   
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A full 91 percent of respondents stated they had cell phones. Although this figure 
is higher than what is listed in Table 9, this survey was taken in late 2012 whereas the 
CIA data was collected in 2011. Of those with cell phones, 79 percent reported sending 
text messages in the past month and 35 percent stated they recorded a video using their 
cell phone in the past month. However, only five percent of those who recorded videos 
on their phone followed this action up and posted the video to the Internet. Roughly half 
of mobile phone users reported either sending or receiving digital content through 
Bluetooth.  
 This part of the social media assessment tool tells how using social media 
technology in Iran might be approached.  It points to using mobile phones if a broad 
audience is desired, but that if the targeted demographic is young, highly educated, tech-
savvy males, Internet-based social media may still be a viable option for interacting with 
this specific group. Additionally, the data shows the importance of off-line social 
networks, and highlights a trust undercurrent amongst the citizens in Iran in terms of the 
faith they put in their family, close friends, and neighbors. The survey also hints at the 
possibility that people do not blindly follow what is disseminated at their local mosques, 
nor what their local government offices are reporting. The data also suggests that most 
Iranians are hesitant about discussing topics of a sensitive nature in public. This means 
there may be a real fear of surveillance and enforcement mechanisms under state control. 
The next several parts of the assessment methodology are designed to provide additional 
details that should be accounted for in operational planning. 
E. GOVERNMENT CENSORSHIP 
The next step in the social media assessment process is to examine how and what 
the targeted government is censoring on both Internet-based social media and SMS 
texting. Additionally, it is important to know which social media sites are blocked and 
which ones are not and whether or not SMS is restricted in any way. These considerations 
furthers an  understanding of what the social media model described in Chapter II looks 
like in a specific country by describing the contested and uncontested media spaces. 
Opennet.net provides a wealth of information on dozens of governments’ attempts to 
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censor and block the Internet in their own countries.200 The figures on the following 
pages provide examples of the types of data available at the website. The countries 
shaded in grey are ones where no data was collected, but this does not mean that filtering 
does not take place in those countries. By understanding what websites are blocked, and 
what types of content or keywords are filtered, an understanding of the constraints and 
obstacles that are in place and must be accounted for when developing plans that 
incorporate social media technology can be considered 
 
Figure 7.  Global Internet Filtering of Internet-Based Political Content201 
                                                 
200 For more information on country specific filtering of the Internet see 
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pol.html (accessed December 12, 2013).  
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Figure 8.  Global Internet Filtering of Internet Tools202 
 
Figure 9.  Global Internet Filtering of Twitter203 
                                                 
202 OpenNet Initiative, “Global Internet Filtering Map,” Opennet.net, http://map.opennet.net/filtering-




Figure 10.  Global Internet Filtering of Facebook204 
Also, this type of information helps determine whether existing social media 
platforms like Facebook and Twitter can be utilized, or if newly developed sites will have 
to be constructed to remain free from blockage. The obvious challenge in this scenario is 
the consideration of building an online network from scratch versus trying to tap into and 
utilize an existing social media-based social network.  The next factor to assess is the 
opposing government’s Internet surveillance capabilities. 
F. GOVERNMENT INTERNET SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY 
As the figures above illustrate, a multitude of countries actively block social 
media websites and censor/filter certain keywords and topics that are posted online. In 
addition to these measures, governments use a variety of hardware and software to 
conduct surveillance on individuals active on the Internet. Specific techniques were 
described in detail in Chapter II. The point in this portion of the assessment is to gain an 
understanding of how a target government conducts online surveillance, and how 
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pervasive the surveillance actually is. An interesting example of a repressive regime 
using a unique means of keeping its citizens off the Internet as well as keeping social 
media users under surveillance can be found in the former Soviet republic of Azerbaijan. 
During the last several years the government of Azerbaijan has executed a media 
campaign designed to discourage its people from even accessing the Internet, let alone 
using social media websites such as Facebook. This form of social filtering associates the 
use of social media with being a deviant, criminal, and a traitor!205 To this end, state 
controlled television programs air episodes of shows that result in various family 
tragedies and criminal incidents because a young person joins Facebook and Twitter. In 
early 2011, the state’s chief psychiatrist stated publically that social media users cannot 
maintain relationships and will suffer mental disorders. In April 2012, the Ministry of the 
Interior linked Facebook with human trafficking and the sexual abuse of young 
people.206 All of this effort has been put into curtailing the use of the Internet even 
though 78 percent of Azerbaijanis have never been on the Internet, and while only seven 
percent of citizens report having a Facebook account.   
Also, instead of openly restricting all citizens from using the Internet or blocking 
sites like Facebook and Twitter  as other repressive regimes do, the government of 
Azerbaijan uses Internet surveillance to allow the regime to monitor and punish any 
rebellious activity.207 By purporting the narrative that Internet use is bad, the government 
has fewer individuals to keep under online surveillance. One example of the effectiveness 
of leaving popular social media sites unblocked, but under surveillance, occurred in 2010. 
Two Azerbaijan activists were arrested and imprisoned for posting a video on YouTube. 
The video the activists posted satirized government waste. Although this particular case  
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was not publicized in Azerbaijan print media, it was reported online. The online reporting 
created fear among other bloggers, and the net result was a decrease in Internet-based 
political dissent.208 
After events unfolded during the Arab Spring, the government of Azerbaijan 
became even more aggressive in its campaign against social media use as well as its 
Internet surveillance. The government portrayed users of social media sites as bad 
citizens of Azerbaijan. This campaign appears to be effective as neighboring Georgia and 
Armenia (which have similar Internet access and computer hardware costs) have more 
than doubled  the amount of daily Internet users (20 percent versus seven percent) and 
computers with Internet connections at home (33 percent and 40 percent versus 11 
percent). By framing the Internet as a “dangerous” place, the government has been 
especially effective in keeping women offline, as only 14 percent of women across the 
country have been on the Internet. Additionally, women in Azerbaijan are concerned 
about violating their family’s honor by engaging in online discussion forums.209 Thus, by 
combining and reinforcing social filters with the demonstrated ability to keep social 
media platforms under surveillance and to punish those who “misuse” it, the government 
of Azerbaijan has been effective in controlling the information its citizens consume. 
G. SECURITY FORCE EFFECTIVENESS AND RANGE OF INFLUENCE 
Ultimately what people care about in terms of whether or not to join a resistance 
movement and what potentially prevents them from joining a social or insurgent 
movement is partially based on their perceived level of risk to themselves and their 
families. As an insurgent movement begins to gain increased political power, which also 
encourages those in a movement to act collectively, the risks associated with being an 
insurgent begin to diminish.210  This in turn, is one factor that assists in facilitating the 
process of cognitive liberation, which research indicates can lead to a sustained social 
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movement.211 One of the most critical important factors in determining if a social 
movement can increase its political power is the effectiveness of the ruling regime’s 
security force effectiveness and range of effectiveness. 
In Yemen, for example, the military and Central Security Forces generally have 
control of the capital city of Sana’a, though the city is basically divided between the areas 
in the southern part of the capital that are loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh 
and the northwest part of the city that is loyal to Ali Mohsen and the Ahmar family.212 
However, regime control of much of the areas outside the capital are extremely 
diminished. The al-Houthi rebel group, for example, has complete control over the 
northern provincial capital of Saada.213 Thus, in Yemen, the reach of the government’s 
security forces is limited. This situation provides potential insurgents in Yemen with a lot 
of physical freedom of movement. In other words, an insurgent operating outside the 
capital of Sana’a could post any type of information on social media platforms without 
the fear of being arrested simply because Yemen’s security forces do not have the 
necessary range of influence to do anything about the online protests. This relationship 
between an insurgent’s relative strength and the distance from a state capital is shown 
graphically in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11.  Rebel Military Strength in Relation to the Distance From the Capital City214 
Also, the absence of restrained or repressive control measures is associated with 
an increase in social movement activity. Thus, research indicates that as a state’s ability 
to act repressively declines, the chances of seeing a resistant social movement 
increases.215 Examples of this dynamic can be found in Iran in the late 1970s, when large 
portions of the armed forces withdrew support for the Shah, in the Solidarity Movement 
in Poland when Soviet leaders failed to aggressively repress that movement, and more 
recently in Egypt when the Egyptian Army refused to fire on its own people during the 
January 20 Revolution that resulted in the removal of Hosni Mubarak from office. So, in 
this portion of the social media assessment, it is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of 
a government’s security forces, the operational reach of those various security forces, and 
whether or not a particular country’s military is willing to turn against its own people 
with violent force. 
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H. INTERNET AND MOBILE PHONE INFRASTRUCTURE 
Assessing existing Internet and cell phone infrastructure will help the U.S. 
determine whether it will have to provide additional, potentially mobile and/or temporary 
infrastructure to support the use of Internet-enabled or cell phone-enabled social media 
technology. This information will in turn help determine whether the U.S. should focus 
on Internet-enabled social media technology or on cell phone-enabled social media 
technology (i.e., SMS).  
The SMS can be used for some of the same purposes as Internet-based social 
media such as mass messaging. An effective tool that facilitates this capability is 
BulkSMS. Also, cell phones, particularly Internet-connected smart phones, can combine 
all other communications media. Cell phones can send and receive various forms of 
information and document events with text, audio, and video. Cell phones can broadcast 
multimedia almost instantly, and can be used to network with other cell phone users.216 
More generally speaking, cell phones can be used as a strategic tool to communicate, 
collaborate, coordinate, and support collective actions.217 Mobiles are also advantageous 
as they are dynamic, diverse, discreet, and direct.218 Cell phones are dynamic in the sense 
that they are generally carried by users all of the time, which facilitates instant and 
simultaneous communications. Cell phones are diverse in that they can connect otherwise 
unconnected people in a given society through the viral spreading of SMS messages. 
These devices are discreet in that they are often equipped with cameras and video 
cameras that can be used to film and take photos in situations in which using  traditional 
camera equipment could be dangerous. Finally, cell phones are direct in that they can be 
used to communicate directly with a targeted audience.219 
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I. OFFLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS 
This is an important consideration because ignoring traditional forms of 
communicating and bypassing indigenous forms of organizing can actually remove 
power from a given network of people.220 One key to developing a strong network of 
individuals is to capitalize and utilize existing social networks. This was an important 
factor in the rapid expansion of the Nazi political party in the 1930s.221 Existing social 
networks lower information and transaction costs for various resources by tapping into 
the trust inherent in pre-established social networks. These existing trust relationships 
also facilitate faster and more efficient member recruitment and member retention.222 
Social networks also provide channels through which unfiltered information can be 
circulated and which provides a counter-balance to official “state” information 
channels.223  
Additionally, strong existing social networks can bypass barriers to collective 
action. Social networks, in other words, create an initial disposition to participate in a 
social movement. Social networks also connect potential recruits with an opportunity to 
protest by moving from internal objectives to taking action224 Networks bypass these 
obstacles by raising money and providing resources needed for mobilization, spreading 
the risk amongst more individuals (and thus reducing each person’s individual level of 
risk), and increasing social solidarity which all increase the likelihood of a collective 
identity emerging.225 It is also important to note that social networks form the pool of 
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recruits most likely to join a social movement.226  Thus, social media can be used to 
activate and mobilize people who are already part of an existing social network into a 
more robust, purpose driven movement, that is, existing social ties and networks can 
elevate the end-state or overall goal  possible by tapping into these existing offline 
networks through social media technology.   These elevated movement goals could 
include, for example, robust and rapid information sharing, a rapidly disseminated 
narrative, mobilization on the streets, or sustained protests. 
J. BACKUP COMMUNICATIONS PATHS 
 These are an important consideration because in times of crisis, people 
will often revert to more traditional forms of communication rather than rely on social 
media technology such as SMS. An example of this can be found in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo where people prefer the use of voice calls over SMS in times of 
distress.227 
Additionally, planners should always develop a communications PACE (primary, 
alternate, contingency, emergency) plan. For example, a central Facebook page (We are 
all Khaled Said in Egypt for example) could be the primary means of communication. 
The alternate means may be a mass SMS distribution list. The contingency could be an 
email distribution list, or an obscure, unknown, insurgent-created social media website 
developed on a platform like Ning.com which was described in Chapter Two. The 
emergency means of communication could be to use a concept called “beeping.” Beeping 
refers to calling another person, who lets the call go unanswered and evaluates the 
meaning of the call based on the number of rings heard before the caller ends the call.228  
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For example, ending a call after letting the phone ring one time could mean to move 
ahead with the plan as agreed upon, while three rings could be to execute the alternate 
plan.   
K. KEY SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCERS  
There are movement entrepreneurs to be tapped into. These individuals provide 
the bridging social capital needed to bring together people from various local 
organizations.229 Part of the success of the Nazi movement, generally considered an 
extremely effective social movement in the 1930s, was the ability to directly recruit and 
mobilize local leaders whose opinions were valued and respected within their local 
communities.230 Social movement entrepreneurs strive to maximize the number of 
network members, mobilize necessary resources, provide a bridge between various local 
groups, forge alliances, and seek out opportunities that will increase the group’s political 
power and influence.231  These individuals appear to be most important and effective 
during the initial building phases of a movement.232  
United States military planners need not look far to find two such social 
entrepreneurs. Although Paul Revere and Joseph Warren lived long before the advent of 
social media, the characteristics of these famous men of U.S. history can provide an 
example of the type of individual that should be sought out within the social media 
environment. In essence, both men excelled in their roles as social bridges that linked 
various disparate organizations spanning the gamut of social classes.233 In addition both 
Revere and Warren had comparatively high numbers of weak ties. These ties are 
especially effective in connecting discrete group to each other.234 These weak ties were 
the result of both Revere and Warren having connections to multiple social clubs such as 
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the St. Andrews Lodge, the Loyal Nine, the Long Room Club, the Boston Committee of 
Correspondence, and several others. However, these organizations were only a loose 
alliance of groups. This lack of cohesion is what made Revere and Warren critical to the 
ultimate success of the American Revolution as they filled the roles of communicators, 
coordinators, and organizers between and amongst these various groups.235 Thus, in 
examining the social media environment in a given country, it is imperative to seek out 
those online activists who appear to have wide-spread relationships and belong to several 
diverse groups. For example, if an individual writes his or her own blog, frequently 
comments on several other blogs, belongs to multiple Facebook groups, and has 500 or 
more Twitter followers, he or she may be a valuable person to seek out to assist in 
achieving U.S. objectives in a given situation. 
L. PREVAILING NARRATIVES AND FRAMES 
Whether engaged in planning an unconventional warfare campaign or planning 
for another type of warfare, understanding the competitive narratives in the target area is 
a key part of proper preparation for strategists at all levels of the military.236  Narratives 
provide the overall context for the specific actions that each side in a competitive 
environment take. Before continuing this discussion, one clarifying comment must be 
provided. Despite some research literature that describes narratives and frames as distinct 
concepts,237 for the purposes of this thesis, the terms narrative, frame, and story will be 
used interchangeably. With that caveat, the thesis will examine the advantages of 
identifying and utilizing insurgent narratives to support an unconventional warfare 
campaign.   
First, insurgents have historically harnessed the power of narratives that evoke 
exodus and redemption because they are powerful at motivating people into collective 
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action.238 When used effectively, these types of narratives can be used to create a sense 
of injustice, identity, and collective efficacy.239  Second, narratives can be used at a 
strategic level to strengthen a collective identity and may also facilitate the development 
of a coherent community, nation, or collective actor.240 In periods of extreme turmoil 
such as in times of insurgent warfare, narratives can help maintain stability of the entire 
group. Finally, narratives provide shared meaning for the members of a resistance 
movement.241  
Narratives work in a variety of ways. First, they provide a link between the 
collective identity of a network and the target an individual’s personal experiences, 
interests, and beliefs.242  They also reconfigure past events, add meaning and continuity 
to the present, and provide a vision of what the future will hold.243 Narratives 
communicate, explain, and persuade people to accept a specific perspective as to what 
happened and why it happened.244 Finally, narratives assign meaning to and interpret 
relevant events and conditions in order to win bystander support and the mobilization of 
antagonists.245  
Ultimately, a narrative should be designed to motivate others to participate in 
collective action that aims to achieve the insurgent’s desired end-state. This is 
accomplished by appealing to a target audience’s intellect, emotion, and imagination.246 
Successful mobilization efforts often depend on how well a narrative resonates with the 
local populace. This is a critical point because at the end of the day, a successful UW 
                                                 
238 Polletta, “Contending Stories,” 419. 
239 Ibid., 421.  
240 Ibid., 422.  
241 Joseph Davis, Stories of Change: Narrative and Social Movements (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2002), 19. 
242 Ibid., 7–9. 
243 Ibid., 12. 
244 Ibid., 12. 
245 David Snow and Robert Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” 
International Social Movement Research 1 (1988): 198.  
246 Davis, Stories of Change, 19. 
 111 
campaign involves getting large numbers of indigenous people to take up arms against 
their own government. Narratives can help motivate people to take up arms.   
In examining narratives in more detail, it is found that there are generally three 
types.247 The first type is labeled as stories of origin. Stories of origin use phrases like 
“being born” or “I was blind, but saw the true light.” These narratives explain why a 
group came together for a common purpose. The second are called stories of defeat and 
are designed to explain hardships. Having narratives that adequately explain a potential 
setback or defeat is important for sustaining a movement in the face of difficulty. This is 
certainly the case in executing UW, as it is extremely challenging to battle an entrenched 
regime. These stories should blame anyone but the group itself (or the group’s leadership) 
for failures. Finally, there are stories of victory. Stories of victory are strategic in nature 
and are designed to entrench the group into the formal political process.248  These 
narratives are especially important in the latter phases of a UW campaign including phase 
six, employment, and phase seven, transition. 
In summary, narratives should provide three things: “a diagnosis of some event or 
aspect of social life as problematic and in need of alteration, a proposed solution to the 
diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done, and a call to arms or rationale 
for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action.”249 All things equal, the more robust 
and developed a movement is in executing these three core tasks, the more successful the 
mobilization effort will be. So the importance of incorporating narratives into one’s 
planned use of social media technology to support a UW campaign cannot be overstated. 
Social media allows for rapid and robust communication and distribution of narratives. 
Unlike any other communications vehicle, social media allows a given entity to spread 
narrative messaging almost instantly to a world-wide audience. Marrying narratives and 
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social media provides the opportunity to capitalize on emerging events in almost real 
time. For example, an insurgent group could use a narrative designed to communicate 
that a regime’s security force is comprised of thugs who indiscriminately target innocent 
civilians. Then, if the insurgents can evoke overreactions from regime security forces, 
capture the brutality on video, and post the video to YouTube in a matter of seconds, it 
has effectively used social media to communicate and rapidly disseminate this narrative.   
The second part of this chapter will provide a general menu of options for which 
social media can be used in support of UW. This section will also highlight the conditions 
under which social media should not be used. The options are broken down into two 
categories: mobile phone-based social media and Internet-based social media. Each of 
these broad categories has a set of three identical options: information operations, passive 
mobilization, and active mobilization. This information is summarized in Table 10. 
M. SOCIAL MEDIA OPTIONS 
Social Media Options Examples 
Mobile Information Operations Narrative, Propaganda, PSYOPS  
Mobile Passive Mobilization Recruiting, Spreading Information 
Mobile Active Mobilization Protests, Demonstrations, Attacks 
Internet Information Operations Narrative, Propaganda, PSYOPS 
Internet Passive Mobilization Recruiting, Spreading Information 
Internet Active Mobilization Protests, Demonstrations, Attacks 
Table 10.   Summary of Options for Using Social Media in an UW Environment 
It is important to note that the social media options and suggestions provided in 
this chapter are not meant to establish limits or hard and fast rules in terms of how social 
media are or are not ultimately utilized in support of an UW campaign. Additionally, the 
options provided are not all inclusive. As the case studies in Chapter III demonstrated, 
social media’s use in times of conflict are varied and dynamic. With social media, like 
other weapons platforms, there are no simple flow charts that can be read to determine 
the best use of social media in every situation. The following information and suggestions 
are meant to provide an organizational framework from which planners can glean general 
guidelines and concepts. The intent is to provide some foundational information from 
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which specific strategies in the utilization of social media in support of UW can be 
derived. Additionally, the three primary uses outlined below are presented in order from 
the option that presents the least risk to personnel (versus risk to mission) to the option 
that presents the greatest risk to personnel.  
1. Information Operations 
U.S. Special Forces (SF) soldiers are specifically selected and trained to conduct 
UW. In fact, SF is the only unit specifically designed to conduct UW.250 As such, SF is 
the principal elements in conducting a UW campaign. However, other elements including 
Military Information Support Operations (MISO) forces, Civil Affairs (CA), and U.S. 
interagency entities also play an important role in the execution of UW. In examining the 
role that MISO plays in support of a UW mission, five key tasks emerge from UW 
doctrine. These information operations tasks are as follows. First, determine key 
psychological factors in the operational environment. Second, provide training and 
advisory assistance to insurgent leaders and units on the development, organization, and 
employment of resistance information capabilities. Third, identify actions with 
psychological effects that can create, change, or reinforce desired behaviors in identified 
target groups or individuals. Fourth, shape popular perceptions to support UW objectives. 
Finally, counter enemy misinformation and disinformation that can undermine the UW 
mission.251  There are a number of specific ways that social media can be used to support 
information operations. 
a. Information Dissemination  
One macro political factor that has been linked to sudden collective 
actions is the pointing out of suddenly imposed grievances.252 This is one of a number of 
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factors that can provide the structural potential for political action.253 Between 
opportunity and action are people with perceived subjective meanings they assign to their 
particular situation. So, for example, simply spreading information about a regime-
imposed grievance does not necessarily lead to mobilization, but if done in the correct 
manner, simply providing evidence of what a particular regime is doing can provide a 
spark that leads to revolution activity. An example of how social media can be used as a 
tool of information operations in support of a growing insurgency can be found in one 
specific event that occurred during the contentious Iranian presidential elections of 2009. 
Neda Agha-Soltan was planning to join the protests in Tehran over the 
perceived corruption in the 2009 Iranian presidential elections.254 As she was standing 
near a crowd observing what was going on around her, she was shot in her chest. 
Reportedly, the shot came from a member of the pro-Iranian militia group Basij.255 
While Neda was lying on the ground fighting for her life, several individuals, including 
her father tried desperately to revive her. As these events were unfolding, an Iranian 
citizen started to film Neda’s struggle using a mobile phone. A still image from the video 
is shown in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12.  Neda Agha-Soltan, A Protestor of the 2009 Iranian Presidential Elections256  
The video was quickly posted to YouTube and spread virally around the 
globe through the use of social media platforms. This video clearly showed a suddenly 
imposed grievance by a repressive Iranian regime. The video’s rapid dissemination led to 
more intense protesting over the next 10 days in Tehran as Iranian students used Twitter, 
Facebook, and Flickr to spread information about the next series of protests.257 
The key take-away from this discussion in terms of planning and 
executing a UW campaign is that operators must be prepared at all times for an 
information operation opportunity. For example, if those involved in an insurgent 
movement have a pre-planned action (such as a small protest) that is intended to provoke 
an overreaction from a local security force, then the leaders of the movement must place 
assets in a position to capture the incident. This means that before any planned insurgent 
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action is executed, the movement must have video cameras and other recording devices 
in position ahead of the planned action so that they are prepared to capture the missteps 
of the ruling regime and exploit those actions by using social media to spread the 
captured incident. A second specific way to think about using social media to engage in 
information operations is through the deliberate spread of narratives. The following 
section builds on the previous discussion of narratives and provides a specific example of 
how one group uses mobile phones to spread their narrative in Africa. 
b. Narrative  
The overall aim in spreading a narrative is to achieve a “significant 
transformation in the collective consciousness of the actors involved.”258 This 
transformation, or cognitive liberation, and the resulting actions that stem from the 
change is the result of accomplishing three things. First, the regime’s political system 
must lose legitimacy. Large numbers of men and women must come to view certain 
aspects of the institutional arrangements that they are subjected to as unjust and wrong. 
Second, citizens who normally believe their current situation is inevitable need to begin 
to assert themselves and demand certain rights. Third, people must begin to feel 
empowered, that they are no longer helpless, and that they can affect their current 
situation.259  
It is important to note, however, that the absence of any one of these three 
factors, or the lack of a large portion of the population experiencing this cognitive 
liberation, can stifle an insurgency.260  This is where the power of social media as a 
communications tool can be especially effective in supporting a UW campaign. Social 
media can, like no other communications medium, reach an enormous audience in an 
almost instantaneous manner and can do so in a constant and repetitive manner. 
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Additionally, social media technology has the potential to give this reach to almost 
anyone with an Internet connection. Thus, social media can be used to spread powerful 
narratives in a short amount of time which then act as cognitive cues. These cognitive 
cues are the signals sent to an insurgent group indicating that the current political regime 
is vulnerable to being overthrown.261 
Another consideration is to look at ways to use social media to influence 
the three primary factors that form the calculus that most individuals use to determine 
whether or not they will actually participate in collective action. These three sets of 
expectations are: 
1. Expectations about the number of participants; 
2. Expectations about one’s own contribution to the probability of 
success; 
3. Expectations about the probability of success if many people 
participate.262 
Social media platforms are good at magnifying the perceived level of 
participation. Thus, if social media can be used to show individuals that “everyone is 
participating” in a given insurgent movement, it is more likely that more individuals will 
join the movement. In particular, social media allows people to connect and form weak 
social ties. This is an important point because research indicates that weak social ties are 
especially effective serving as diffusion channels for information.263  An example from 
the website irevolutions.net will demonstrate one group’s use of mobile phone-based 
social media to spread a narrative. 
In its recent past, ethnically based violence has been the hallmark of 
Kenya’s political scene. Even remote places like the Rift Valley have witnessed horrific 
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violence because of prejudices and poisonous feelings that surround political elections.264 
One network that is using social media to spread a narrative to counter this on-going 
violence is PeaceTXT. PeaceTXT uses mobile phone technology to send out social 
narratives urging an end to ethnic violence. Empirical research has already shown that 
repetitive SMS messages can change behaviors.265 Researchers believe that repetitive 
narrative messaging can always change people’s behaviors as they relate to periods of 
conflict.266 
2. Passive Mobilization267 
The second overarching way of using social media to support the conduct of UW 
is through passive mobilization. Passive mobilization involves bringing people to see a 
particular issue or situation in a specific way that aligns with the point of view or 
objective of a given movement. There are several ways in which to use social media for 
passive mobilization in support of UW. Two basic means are through recruitment and 
social media activism. 
a. Recruitment  
Social media has the potential to bring large numbers of people together in 
a short period of time. By reaching out to a few dozen individuals who are active on 
social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, and various blog sites it is possible to have 
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those individuals join a resistance movement. If each of those individuals have several 
hundred or several thousand electronically linked people that they reach out to, it is not 
hard to envision how quickly a network of people can grow to number tens of thousands. 
In fact, tapping into existing social networks (such as student unions, labor unions, clubs 
and other civic organizations) is the most effective way to build a large social movement. 
Research indicates that it is much more effective to recruit large “blocks” 
of people into a given cause versus trying to recruit individuals. Thus, effective 
movements are those that can recruit established networks of people, not isolated 
individuals.268  Additionally, people with strong interpersonal links to each other are less 
likely to feel powerless to change their current situation. This is because people who are 
isolated socially are more likely to explain their lot in life as a function of their individual 
circumstances instead of more broad situational factors.269  Social media technology can 
help recruit individuals into a cause, that they might otherwise not join, by providing an 
environment in which to develop relationships with other people and thus break the 
feeling of isolation. Another important note is that it is important to target the right type 
of person in recruiting efforts. 
Motivating people to take action is much easier if the right people are 
recruited. One characteristic of an ideal recruit is a person who is involved in several 
collective settings (a college student who is in the student government, in a fraternity, and 
plays on the rugby team).270  Social media not only helps identify these ideal recruits, but 
is, in and of itself, another potential collective setting for someone to be a part of, which 
furthers the likelihood of that person taking an active role in support of a resistance 
movement. A good example of using social media to recruit large numbers of individuals 
into a collective movement can be found during the revolutionary protests that occurred 
in Egypt during the Arab Spring. 
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The April 6 Youth Movement was started on March 23, 2008 when a 
group of Egyptian activists started a Facebook page. The page was used to help rally 
support for a textile workers’ strike in the city of Mahalla. The textile workers were 
planning to strike in protest of low hourly wages and increasingly high food prices.271 
One of the group’s founders was a young woman named Asmaa Mahfouz. Over the next 
several years the April 6 Youth Movement grew in size and in its political goals. 
Eventually, the movement joined other like-minded networks for the common cause of 
ousting Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Several days before the famous January 25 
protest in Tahrir Square, Asmaa and several other members of the April 6 Youth 
Movement tried to rally support for a protest in downtown Cairo. The turn-out was 
abysmal. Rather than stop her efforts, Asmaa turned to social media to recruit others to 
her cause.   
Originally posted on Facebook, Asmaa made a four minute video 
explaining the grievances that she and others had experienced and explained that four 
people had recently immolated themselves in protest, yet no one was doing anything 
about it. She then challenged Egyptian men to follow her lead by joining her protest 
movement and encouraged them to invite their entire social network to do the same. 
Figure 13 is a still shot of the video that went viral on Facebook and YouTube. The 
English translation is at the bottom of the picture. 
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Figure 13.  Asmaa Mahfouz Recruiting Video Posted on YouTube Prior to the January 25 
Protests in Egypt272 
Ultimately, Asmaa’s recruiting efforts were successful, as the video was 
viewed by over a million people and motivated thousands to join the protests that 
eventually led to regime change in Egypt. This is one example of the many ways in 
which a practitioner of UW could use social media to recruit others to join resistance 
efforts. Engaging others through blogs, Twitter, SMS messaging, and other social media 
platforms provides other mechanisms that operators can use to screen and recruit 
indigenous personnel to join their movement. A second social media-based passive 
mobilization task involves motivating others to take action themselves on social media 
platforms. 
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b. Social Media Activism 
For an UW campaign to succeed eventually, indigenous people must take 
up arms in revolt against their government. Getting individuals to take to the streets to 
oppose a repressive regime is not an easy task. As a first step in this direction, military 
planners and leaders should consider working to get network members to take an active 
role in support of the movement. Examples of using social media for passive mobilization 
include writing blog posts or commentary on a Facebook page, posting photos or videos 
on a video sharing website, forwarding emails or SMS messages, translating Internet 
content from a native language to English or another target language, or editing videos. 
The Egyptian revolution during the Arab Spring provides a good example of a movement 
leader passively mobilizing his network. 
In June 2010, Wael Ghonim was working at Google as the head of 
marketing for the Middle East and North Africa. While browsing his Facebook page, 
Wael noticed that a friend had posted a shocking photo on his Facebook wall. The picture 
was of a young male with a disfigured face. After some investigating, Wael found out the 
man’s name was Khaled Mohamed Said and that he was reportedly killed by a brutal 
beating sustained at the hands of two secret police officers in Alexandria.273 Outraged 
and tired of the police brutality, Wael designed a Facebook page to expose the corruption 
that had plagued the Ministry of Interior for years. 
Using the page title “We Are All Khaled Said,” Wael decided to 
administer the page anonymously. After creating the page, Wael made his first post, 
which said, “Today they killed Khaled. If I don’t act for his sake, tomorrow they will kill 
me.”274  Within two minutes the page had 300 followers. Wael continued to post to the 
page and the number of members in his newly created network exploded. As the page 
continued to grow, Wael realized he needed his network to take an active role in helping 
his cause. To get his members to take action, Wael started asking for assistance. The first 
several members to help Wael were engaged in passive mobilization. 
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One of the first to respond to Wael’s call for assistance came from 
Mohamed Ibrahuim, an Egyptian living in the United Kingdom. Mohamed expressed 
interest in translating the content from the Khaled Said page, and asked Wael if he could 
start an English version of Wael’s page. Wael immediately agreed and the English 
Facebook page was created. The page received immediate attention and helped spread the 
narrative that was beginning to play out in Egypt.275  A second volunteer, Khaled Kamel, 
responded to Wael and said he would do video editing for the website. Khaled took the 
best parts of various videos, edited them together and set them to music.276  The video 
“mash-ups” were a powerful motivating tool. Although mobilizing a network on the 
Internet or through mobile platforms is not as powerful as getting members to take 
physical actions in their environment, it is a positive step in developing an effective 
resistance movement. Getting people to take actions online gives them a sense of 
belonging and that their actions matter to the movement. Such UW practitioners should 
consider this intermediate step as a step towards their ultimate goals. This leads to the 
final and most important option in terms of using social media to support an UW 
campaign, active mobilization. 
N. ACTIVE MOBILIZATION277 
Active mobilization is the most difficult, yet crucial use of social media in terms 
of maximizing this technology’s potential to support the execution of UW. Active 
mobilization is the process of getting existing network members to take physical actions 
on behalf of a movement’s goals and desired end-state. Although it may not be feasible or 
advisable for every situation, active mobilization represents the pinnacle of the potential 
use of social media to support a UW mission. 
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Viewed holistically, active mobilization really encompasses and adds to the first 
two uses of social media, information operations and passive mobilization. In actuality, if 
a resistance movement is able to actively mobilize network members through social 
media, the group should also be continually using social media for information operations 
as well as passive mobilization. All three tasks can be done simultaneously and 
continuously under the right conditions and circumstances. 
The most obvious example of using social media for active mobilization involves 
the coordination and organization of a physical protest. The activists involved in the Arab 
Spring used social media to coordinate times, locations, and rules of conduct while 
protesting. They also used social media to disseminate location of security forces and 
areas to avoid. Other examples could be to coordinate strikes, walkouts, flash mobs, 
boycotts, acts of sabotage, etc. In Iran, students used the photo sharing site Flickr to 
communicate to fellow protestors the locations of the next round of protests, as well as 
which areas to avoid because of the presence of large numbers of security force 
personnel.278 A more robust example can be found by returning to examine Wael 
Ghonim’s Facebook-initiated insurgency. His actions provide a complete example of how 
social media can be used in each of the aforementioned ways. 
Initially, Wael Ghonim’s goal in creating his now famous Facebook page was to 
bring awareness to the police brutality that was far too common in Egypt (information 
operations). After experiencing some initial success, Wael’s ambition for his movement 
grew and so did his plan of execution. To achieve his ultimate goal of active 
mobilization, Wael developed a four phased plan built around the “sales tunnel” approach 
to marketing.279  The first phase was designed simply to get people in his network joining 
the Facebook page and reading the page’s content (passive mobilization - recruiting). The 
second phase was to convince his network participants to interact with other network 
members by “liking” and “commenting” on the information that was being posted to the 
                                                 
278 United For Iran, “16 Azar Green Routes,” Flickr, 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/united4iran/4165827330/ (accessed May 18, 2013). 
279 Ghonim, Revolution 2.0, 67. 
 125 
page. The third phase involved having members participate in the page’s online 
campaigns, and begin to upload and post content to the page themselves (passive 
mobilization—social media activism). The fourth and most important phase was to 
motivate network members to take action by protesting the Mubarak regime in the streets 
(active mobilization).280  Wael realized that getting the network to take action on the 
ground was the key to raising the level of interaction among network members and to 
actually have a chance of overthrowing the Mubarak regime. This interaction was vital 
for the sustainability of the network because it increased the connectivity of the network 
and built stronger social ties among the various members.281  Now that the three primary 
ways to use social media to support UW have been discussed, situations in which using 
social media may not be the most appropriate option in terms of building, 
communicating, and directing a network in the context of UW will be considered. 
O. DEFICIENT SOCIAL MEDIA CONDITIONS 
There are two general ways of determining when it may not be appropriate to use 
social media to support a UW campaign. The first method is to go through the twelve 
factors described above in the social media assessment methodology. At the end of that 
assessment. if it is determined that the opposition government in question has effective 
social media censorship and surveillance capabilities, has the ability to shut down or 
significantly slow down Internet and mobile phone connectivity, and has an enforcement 
mechanism with a range of influence that extends to all borders, then using social media 
to support a resistance movement will most likely be counter-productive. Currently, the 
Chinese regime presents a challenging social media environment where the government’s 
capabilities and resource advantages likely outweigh the potential that social media 
technology would bring to a movement’s efforts. However, that is not to say that social 
media cannot be used in a deceptive manner or as a tool of psychological operations. 
Additionally, Bluetooth connectivity on mobile devices may also offer opportunities to 
use social media in an extremely restrictive environment. So although the more 
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traditional uses of social media may not be appropriate in a country like China, creative 
planners may still find ways to utilize social media in this operational area. The second 
way of looking at the appropriateness of social media’s use in the context of 
revolutionary warfare is by looking at the actions and visibility of the movement. 
In her examination of social networks, researcher Florence Passy examined social 
networks by breaking them down as having two characteristics. The two characteristics 
were action repertoire (legal versus illegal types of operations) and the level of public 
visibility (high or low). Figure 14 illustrates this simple construct. The type of network  
to be built (clandestine or open) and the type of activites the network will be engaged in 
(legal or illegal) will determine whether social media should be used to support the 
movement. For example, social media should not be used to recurit people in cases where 
one is trying to create a small, low visibility, illegal activity-based network. This type of 
recruiting should be done in person, preferably by someone with personal ties to the 
potential recruit. Having personal ties reduces the risk a clandetine network takes when it 
makes initial contact with a recruit and asks him or her to join the group.282  
Additionally, social media should not be used when the organization in question wants to 
remain off the regime’s radar, so to speak, especially if the network will be engaged in 
illegal activities and does not yet have the strength or resiliency to withstand constant 
repression from the government in power. Therefore,  if the movement in question would 
fall categorially in the lower-left quadrant (low visibily, illegal), then social media would 
not be  appropriate in supporting this effort. 
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Figure 14.   Organization of Social Movements Based on Legality and Visibility283 
P. CONCLUSION 
Doing a thorough analysis of the twelve factors in the social media assessment 
methodology will provide military planners the necessary information to determine how 
to most appropriately use social media technology in support of UW. Once this initial 
assessment is complete, the next step is to determine which basic platform to use: 
Internet-based social media, mobile phone-based social media, both in combination, or 
neither. After determining which platforms will best support the UW mission, the next 
step is to determine how to actually use the selected platforms. The three basic ways of 
social media in support of UW are information operations, passive mobilization, and 
active mobilization. After this step is complete, strategists are in a position to actually 
design a social media technology plan that would support the overall campaign plan. 
Finally, it is important to remember that social movements are developed as a response to 
an interplay between various movement groups themselves and the greater sociopolitical 
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(or lack of opportunities) for an insurgent group to engage in successful collective action 
varies significantly over time, it is important to remember that constant re-evaluation of 
the social media environment is necessary.284   
Examples of the types of events that can cause these variances include war, 
industrialization, political realignments, defections, fractures among regime elites 
(especially between military and government leaders), extended unemployment, a natural 
disaster, and many others. So while using social media in a certain way at a given time 
may make sense, changing conditions may impact the way social media should be used 
going forward. The resistance elements in Iran found this out after using Facebook, 
Twitter, and various other social media platforms to protest the outcome of the 2009 
presidential elections. Seeing the potential that these popular platforms provided 
insurgent elements, the Iranian government started blocking all major social media 
websites, including Facebook and Twitter. This situation explains why one of the 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A headline from a 1987 edition of the Los Angeles Times read “Tape Recording: 
the Modern Medium of Dissent.”285 The article opened by stating that student 
demonstrators were advocating for democracy in China and free elections in Taiwan. The 
article then stated that “both events involved creative, effective use of technology to 
spread messages in ways that would have been impossible only a decade ago.”286 It 
continued to describe how inexpensive video recorders, tape recorders, and double-
cassette decks allowed for the widespread dissemination of information, while at the 
same time making it difficult for repressive regime officials to eradicate these alternate 
sources of information. The two examples the article provided, which are now over two 
decades old, provide insight into both the history and potential that emerging technology 
brings to those that oppose oppression.  
In Taiwan, members of the opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP), used video cameras to capture government security forces beating up supporters 
of a dissident returning home through Taipei’s Chiang Kai-Shek International Airport. 
Over the next several days, Taiwanese government-controlled television stations aired 
edited versions of the airport melee. The commentators used the doctored video to 
portray the opposition party as violence-prone individuals whose only intentions were to 
cause instability and disruption throughout Taiwan. However, because the opposition 
party had had their own cameras rolling during the fighting, they were able to provide a 
counter-narrative. They did this by duplicating the video over and over and distributing 
copies to their local political offices. These local offices then set up television monitors 
outside their offices and played the unedited videos on a continuous loop. Thousands of 
onlookers viewed the video and many seemed eager to view something other than the 
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government’s “official” version of the event.287 After this incident, the DPP made a 
surprisingly strong showing at the polls and made gains in its overall level of popular 
support. During this same time period, Chinese students used even less sophisticated 
means to spread a counter-narrative. 
Having grown frustrated by security forces’ continual confiscation of their 
underground magazines and tearing down of opposition posters, groups of Chinese 
students turned to other means of communicating their anti-communist message: the tape 
recorder and double-cassette deck. The students would go out at night with flashlights 
and mini-recorders and make voice recordings of the messages written on pro-democracy 
posters. These same posters were being torn down each morning by local security forces. 
After recording the content of each poster, students would return quietly to their dorm 
rooms and begin copying the tapes in their double-cassette decks. The duplicated cassette 
tapes would then be passed around from room to room, campus to campus, and 
eventually city to city.288  The Chinese students discovered that this form of information 
operations was much more difficult to stop or control because it was much tougher for 
security forces to listen to hours and hours of audio recordings compared to sifting 
through a stack of magazines or pamphlets. 
The point in recounting these stories is to reinforce the idea that using current 
communication technology to disseminate information to oppose an oppressive regime is 
not a new phenomenon created by Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. The insurgents in 
Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and elsewhere were not the first to use an emerging 
technology to help stop oppression. What is new, however, is the way in which current 
social media technology can hyper-accelerate the dissemination of information. A 
powerful narrative told through user-generated content has the potential to reach tens of 
millions of people in a few hours and to rally those same viewers into joining a 
movement. Those DPP leaders or the Chinese students would have taken much longer to 
have their messages reach one million people. Thus, social media exhibits a true 
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demarcation point from all other previously discussed communications technology. 
Because of this vast potential, it is absolutely imperative for the U.S. military to make 
serious investments into using social media as a force multiplier in all future conflicts, 
especially in executing UW. The remainder of this chapter will provide recommendations 
for the authorities, in training and education, and in the doctrine needed to maximize the 
potential of social media in support of military operations. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Authority 
Expanding the authorities surrounding the military’s use of social media in 
executing UW may be the most difficult obstacle for the U.S SOF to overcome in terms 
of being able to successfully utilize social media in support of future UW campaigns. 
Two types of authorities are involved, legal and command.  
a. Legal Authority 
Generally speaking, the U.S. military has the legal authority to utilize 
social media technology in support of DoD objectives so long as foreign audiences are 
the target of the information operation. The most basic legal guideline comes in the form 
of the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, which “prohibits domestic dissemination of information 
designed for foreign consumption, as a way to ban domestic propaganda. By policy and 
practice, the DoD adheres to Smith-Mundt restrictions on domestic propaganda.”289 
Although this law appears rather straightforward, controversy still surrounds the U.S. 
military’s use of social media because anything distributed through social media 
platforms has the potential to be accessed by U.S. citizens. As an example, U.S. Central 
Command’s Operation Earnest Voice (OEV), which provides the U.S. military the ability 
to have one service member control multiple online personalities, created headlines by 
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accusing the U.S. military of using social media to run spy operations.290  Despite the 
occasional negative headline, U.S. law provides the basic framework needed to operate 
effectively in the social media environment. Therefore, the most pressing area that needs 
to be addressed in order for the military to be able to effectively use social media in 
support of UW is command authority. 
b. Command Authority 
The approval chain for traditional military information support operations 
(MISO) programs can reach the highest levels of the U.S. government. The formal 
approval chain is depicted in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15.  Military Information Support Operations Program Approval Chain291 
This formal approval process may be sufficient for the generation and approval of MISO 
products when sufficient time allows for product development and dissemination. But in 
                                                 
290 Nick Fielding and Ian Cobain, “Revealed: US Spy Operation that Manipulates Social Media,” The 
Guardian, March 17, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/mar/17/us-spy-operation-social-
networks (accessed May 10, 2013).  
291 Department of the Army, FM 3-53, 2–3. 
 133 
fluid environments, where the adversary is not bound by any approval chains or 
timelines, the command authority to disseminate content on social media must be 
entrusted to lower level military commanders. Operation VALHALLA provides an 
example that crystallizes the need to streamline the MISO approval chain. 
During a March 26, 2006 operation, U.S. Special Forces tracked down a 
group of Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) insurgents who were responsible for the murders of Iraqi 
citizens and soldiers. After reaching the JAM stronghold, a firefight ensured that resulted 
in 16 or 17 JAM personnel killed. Additionally, a weapons cache was found, a tortured 
hostage was rescued, and another 16 JAM members were detained.292  After the mission 
was completed, the U.S. Special Forces and Iraqi soldiers returned to their base. By all 
standards, this was a very successful operation for the combined force.  
At the time, there was typically 24 to 48 hours between an event occurring 
and the insurgents posting propaganda on the Internet. However, after this particular 
incident, propaganda was populating the Internet in less than one hour.293  Someone had 
moved the dead JAM bodies and removed the weapons that the JAM fighters had been 
using to engage the combined force. The bodies were arranged to appear as if they were 
shot while in prayer. Photographs depicting this new arrangement and a story accusing 
American soldiers of entering a mosque and killing unarmed men spread quickly around 
the Internet. Both American and Arab media outlets picked up on the story and began to 
report.294 
When a story of this nature hits the U.S. press, the military’s reaction is 
almost always to open an investigation. The Special Forces unit that conducted the 
operation was ordered to stand down, which meant they were no longer able to conduct 
combat operations. By aggressively and efficiently landing the first information 
operations punch, JAM not only bested the U.S. military from a strategic narrative 
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perspective, but also gained freedom of maneuver as an effective combat force was taken 
out of the fight for almost one month.295  But this situation did not have to unfold the 
way that it did. 
The Special Forces operators had been accompanied by soldiers who were 
trained as combat cameramen. These specially trained soldiers record combat footage and 
are often embedded with tactical ground forces. In addition, several Operational 
Detachment—Alpha (ODA) members were wearing helmet cameras that provided 
additional footage of the operation. The videos captured during the operation provided 
clear contrasts between the JAM doctored photos and what actually occurred. Instead of 
the immediate chain of command (company and battalion level commanders) viewing the 
Special Forces footage and making a command decision to release it, the U.S. 
government sat on the information for three days. The briefing was finally delivered by 
then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Secretary Rumsfeld briefed from the exact 
same post-mission storyboards that were produced at the battalion level.296  
By the time the truth was reported by the U.S. government, the strategic 
damage had been done. The inability to immediately react to the JAM account of the 
firefight by posting a counter-story was primarily caused by a cumbersome approval 
policy.297 Operation VALHALLA demonstrated the dire need for trusting, empowering, 
and authorizing battalion level commanders to execute information operations through 
social media. 
C. THE WAY AHEAD 
One suggested way to move forward in terms of changing command authority is 
for centralized planning and decentralized execution.298 This can be accomplished by 
having clear guidance issued from the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), 
                                                 
295 Dauber, “Responding to Insurgent Disinformation,” 14.   
296 Ibid., 20.  
297 Mayfield III, “A Commander’s Strategy,” 82. 
298 Ibid., 82. 
 135 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict 
(ASD[SO/LIC]), and Interagency/Intergovernmental Support (IIS). This guidance can 
then be refined down the military chain of command through the geographic combatant 
commander and the Department of State through the chief of mission. Armed with a clear 
set of information operation rules of engagement, commanders at the battalion level 
should then be given the command authority to release products through social media. In 
certain situations this authority may need to be extended down to the O-3 level. One 
example would be during the first four phases of UW. More specific to supporting UW, 
command authority for releasing information products also needs to include concurring 
host nation or partner nation or organization attribution, delayed attribution, and non-
attribution.299 These attribution methods will be more likely to be used in a UW 
campaign compared to immediate attribution. 
Future UW proficiency will depend on these expanded command authorities.300 
Without the property authority, special operations forces will not be empowered to take 
the initiative when presented an opportunity to strike first with social media. In addition, 
SOF commanders at all levels have tasked ARSOF to improve their war-fighting 
capabilities in various ways. Specifically in the Commander’s ARSOF 2022 strategic 
guidance, LTG Charles Cleveland enumerated his priorities into six categories. 
Under category six, Optimize Resourcing and Commodity Areas, there is number 
6G, MISO Systems. The challenge presented is that the proliferation of both Internet-
based and mobile phone-based social media technology has presented unprecedented 
opportunities both for the enemy and ARSOF.301 One of the potential short-term 
solutions presented is to develop innovative tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) 
for utilizing social media in support of special warfare and surgical strike operations. 
However, the most robust, carefully crafted, and effective social media TTPs will have a 
significantly reduced level of effectiveness if the proper authorities are not in place to 
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allow tactical level commanders the ability to use social media without a cumbersome 
and inefficient approval process. Additionally, the type of command authority described 
above provides one example of what is needed to achieve United States Special 
Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) concept of enduring engagements that require 
small-footprint distributed operations.    
According to the current USSOCOM Operating Concept, which provides the 
Commander’s vision for the organization in 2020, enduring engagements require small, 
task-organized SOF teams empowered by mission command in areas where a large U.S. 
military presence is unacceptable.302 Mission command refers to the idea that SOF 
elements require a decentralized style of command that allows for freedom and speed of 
action within a given set of limitations. This operating concept allows subordinate 
commanders to use their higher command’s intent, their assigned mission, the desired 
effect to be achieved, and the reasons behind the mission. The tactical leader is then 
allowed the freedom of action and entrusted with the responsibility to determine how to 
best achieve mission success. Having the legal and command authorities to operate in the 
social media environment is the first part of empowering SOF operators to harness this 
technology. The next three components, education and training, doctrine, and funding are 
critical aspects of being able to fully realize the power of social media. 
1. Training and Education 
One of the key tenets of United States Special Operations Command’s 
(USSOCOM) Operating Concept is to elevate SOF non-lethal skills to the same level of 
proficiency as lethal skills.303 Developing proficiency in using social media to support 
SOF operations is an example of a much needed non-lethal skill. Training on using social 
media has already begun. Several Special Forces Groups (Airborne) have integrated 
social media utilization into major UW training exercises, and elements of First Special 
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Warfare Training Group (Airborne) have developed TTPs for integrating social media 
into UW training at the Special Forces Qualification Course. However, similar to 
marksmanship training on an assigned weapon system, basic standards of evaluation 
should be developed to ensure each SOF element has a similar baseline.  Training with 
social media technology can be enhanced by introducing formal blocks of instruction on 
using social media into the educational courses offered by the U.S. Army John F. 
Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS). 
There are a number of specific courses in which social media technology and 
utilization should be taught. Introductory and basic concepts should be taught during the 
CA, PSYOP, and SF Qualification courses. Advanced training is appropriate in a number 
of courses including, but not limited to, the MISO ISO Unconventional Warfare Course, 
the MISO Advanced Planner’s Course, the Special Forces Intelligence Sergeant Course 
(SFISC), the Special Forces Network Development Course (NDC), and the 
Unconventional Warfare Operational Design Course (UWODC). Part of the educational 
process should include real world experimentation. This would allow operators the 
opportunity to assess the effectiveness of their various social media operations. The next 
facet of incorporating social media into future SOF operations is to capture the lessons 
learned from training, education, and experience into formal doctrine. 
2. Doctrine 
Military doctrine bridges the gap between broad policy and tactical level TTPs. 
Doctrine provides the guiding principles necessary to conduct operations in accordance 
with approved, tested, and proven methods. Doctrine is authoritative on the subject 
matter covered, but it is not directive in nature. By adding social media utilization into 
military doctrine, SOF leaders can ensure that there is some universality in the quality of 
training and education that each SOF operator receives. Although the most creative and 
effective uses of social media may not come from those with a formalized doctrine 
background, it is important to establish guiding principles (strict adherence to the Smith-
Mundt Act for example) that are commonly followed.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
In examining the use of social media in support of military operations, 
particularly UW, it is important to keep in mind the laws of the countries in which the 
media will be used. As an example, the Vietnamese government recently imprisoned 
three bloggers for online posts that were critical of the government.304 Additionally, it is 
good practice to ask whether a particular action carried out on social media is ethical or 
not. Careful legal and ethical considerations are critical for long-term, successful use of 
social media.305 Acting in accordance with local laws and by an ethical code of conduct 
does not negate the need for military commanders to be pro-active and offensive in nature 
when using social media. 
A commander who develops an aggressive social media engagement strategy can 
win the information and narrative fight. Ignoring social media is not an option.306  The 
U.S. military can look to the lessons the Israeli military learned from losing the narrative 
battle on social media to Hezbollah in the second Lebanon War in 2006 and how the 
Israelis had social media utilization right two years later when they attacked the Gaza 
Strip in December 2008 and January  2009.307 Finally, as Brian Petit stated, “the future 
study, practice and successful execution of future UW must deliberately incorporate and 
account for the highly public sphere of social media. For U.S. SF engaging in UW, the 
effective use of social media and the use of handheld technologies is perhaps less about 
technology training and more about mindset shifts in how we view the boundaries of 
UW.”308 This change is required from leaders at all levels and must occur sooner rather 
than later because of the overwhelming potential that social media represents in shaping 
the outcome of future military operations.  
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Returning to the article from the Los Angeles Times that was used in the 
introduction of this chapter, author Jim Mann wrote the following: 
Home-made videotapes of demonstrations and audio recordings of wall 
posters barely begin to exhaust the possibilities for dissent raised by the 
new consumer technologies. What happens when personal computers are 
so prevalent that students can call, at a few moments’ notice, for 
nationwide demonstrations or labor leaders for a general strike? Or when 
some computer-savvy firebrand can send out the word along his network: 
“Workers of the world, unite! You have nothing to lose but your 
software”? 
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